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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vsLAURA DABLE

Priority No. 2
Case No. 20020096 CA

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty on the 4th day of October, 2001
and the oral order of Judgement and Sentence was imposed and entered in the trial court
on the 13th day of December, 2001 and the Commitment, Judgement and Order was
signed and filed by the Court on the 10th day of January, 2002. A Notice of Appeal was
filed by the Defendant on the 13th day of December, 2001.(See Appendix A) A second
Notice of Appeal was filed within 30 days of the filing of written judgement of the Court.
The appeal is from a criminal judgement pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-L (1953 as amended).
Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-2a3(e), (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether the Defendant adequately preserved the issues presented on appeal in
light of Defendant's guilty plea

1
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II. Whether the district court erred in determining that the search warrant affidavit
sufficiently established probable cause pursuant to the requirements of the United States
Constitution and specifically the 4th and 14th Amendments thereto rendering the issuance
of a search warrant based on the claimed deficiencies unlawful as follows::
A. The Affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish
reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be located at
Defendant's residence.
B. The affidavit failed to establish the veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge with respect to each of the informants in the affidavit.
C. There was no attempt to justify the execution of a No-Knock, Night
Search.
III. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule has no application to the
questioned search.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review when this Court reviews issues of law on appeal is that
of correctness of the trial court's interpretation of Utah Law.
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
The determinative laws applicable to this case are the following:
RULES CITED
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

2
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Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205 (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution. Amendment IV
United States Constitution Amendment XIV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
1. This appeal is from a final judgment and sentence orally imposed and entered
in the First District Court for Rich County, State of Utah on the 13th day of December,
2001 and from the written order entered on the 10th day of January, 2002 convicting
the Defendant of the offenses of Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Substance
(amended) - (3rd Degree Felony) and Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled
Substance(amended) - (Class B Misdemeanor).
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
1. A Search Warrant issued on the 7th day of June, 2000 by a Justice of the Peace
3
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sitting as a Magistrate in Rich County Utah was executed on that same evening.
2. Based on items seized pursuant to the said Search Warrant the
Defendant was ultimately accused of crimes committed in Rich County State
of Utah as follows:
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated s58-37-8(2)(a)(a a
second degree felony, as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the
defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit
Methamphetamine [II substance], and committed the offense: (ix) within 1,000 feet of
any structure, facility, or grounds included in subsection (i) through (viii); to wit school
zone.
COUNT 2: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
IN A DRUG FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated S58-37-8(2)(e). a class A
Misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the defendant
did knowingly and intentionally possess or use less than one ounce of marijuana, a
Schedule I controlled substance, and committed the offense:(ix) within 1,000 feet of any
structure, facility, or grounds included in subsection (i) through (viii), to wit school zone.
COUNT 3: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG
FREE ZONE in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37a-5n\ a class A Misdemeanor,
as follows: That on or about June 7, 2000, in Rich County, the defendant did knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant,
4
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propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce controlled substance into the human body. Furthermore, the
defendant committed the offense: (ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in subsection(i) through (viii); to wit school zone.
3. The Defendant was arraigned and a Preliminary Hearing was thereafter held on
the 6th day of February, 2001, whereupon Defendant was bound over to stand trial.
4. The Defendant, after arraignment in District Court, filed a Motion to
Suppress Evidence and as grounds the Defendant alleged that the facts recited
in the affidavit and presented to the Magistrate in support of the warrant were
insufficient to permit the Magistrate to make a finding of 'Probable Cause'. The
motion, supported by a Memorandum In Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence (see
Appendix B) addressed the other issues presented by this appeal as well.
5. A Hearing on Defendant's motion was had on the 1st day of May, 2001 and the
court by oral Order denied said motion in its entirety, said Order was reduced to writing
and filed in the District Court on the 26th day of June, 2001.(See Appendix C)
6. Defendant did, on the 4th day of October, 2001, enter a conditional plea of
guilty reserving the issues presented here for appeal; the court accepted said plea as
conditional and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties stayed imposition of sentence
pending this appeaUSee Appendix D)

5
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C. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT:
7. The Defendant filed an Application for a Certificate of Probable Cause (See
Appendix E) which application was approved after acceptance of the conditional plea
of guilty and sentence.

The Conditional Plea reserved issues for appeal as follows:

A. The validity of the Search Warrant
B. The adequacy of the underlying affidavits
C. The question of whether the Search Warrant was issued on probable
cause
D. Certain other irregularities and inadequacies noted in the pleadings.
8. The Court required that a pre-sentence be prepared and submitted prior to
imposition of sentence. The court then reviewed the pre-sentence report and considered
the recommendations therein and sentenced the Defendant to an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, which sentence was suspended in favor of
Probation. Defendant was required on Charge 1 to serve a term of 30 days and on Charge
2 a term of 180 day(s), in jail, the total time suspended for charge 2 was 180 day(s) the
Defendant was also sentenced to pay fines totaling $1400.00, plus interest, to attend
alcohol and/or drug counseling and to adhere to standard conditions of probation.
Defendant's Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted and the imposition
of the probationary sentence was stayed pending this appeal.

D. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS:
9. The Defendant was, on or about June 7, 2000, subjected to a Category 2 stop
6
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while driving her motor vehicle in Lincoln County, within the State of Wyoming. The
stop was effected by Wyoming officers after those officers purported to obtain
information from an unnamed person alleged to be confidential informant (that informant
actually, confessed to being an accomplice of Defendant) that the Defendant was about to
enter Wyoming from Utah with the purpose to consummate a methamphetamine sale at
the informant's residence; the confidential informant is further alleged to have advised
the Wyoming Police that the Defendant's Utah drivers license was suspended. Based
on that information and upon suspicion of speeding Wyoming officers executed the
Category 2 stop of Defendant's vehicle.. The Wyoming officers confiscated what was
alleged to be methamphetamine and thereupon arrested Defendant.1
10. Defendant's residence in the rural town of Randolph, Rich County, Utah,
is geographically adjacent to the Wyoming County where Defendant was arrested.
Wyoming authorities notified the Rich County, Utah Sheriffs Office of the arrest and
relayed to the Utah officers the facts that the confidential informant had reported to them
that Defendant planned on procuring drugs in Ogden, Utah and thereafter transporting the
drugs to sell in Lincoln County, Wyoming for sale. Wyoming officers also relayed the
information that what they supposed to be marijuana and methamphetamine had been
confiscated from Defendant's vehicle.
11. According to the Wyoming officers, Defendant had, during the Wyoming

1

The Defendant was convicted in Wyoming as a result of the roadside search and
received a probationary sentence.
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stop, confessed that she had procured the confiscated drugs in Ogden, Utah and had
stopped at her residence in Randolph, Utah for several hours before her arrest in
Wyoming.
12. Based on the information relayed by the Wyoming officers, the Utah officers
sought to obtain a search warrant of Defendant's residence from a local magistrate.

By

way of Affidavit in an effort to support probable cause, a Utah officer sought to bolster
the Wyoming information with the added information that another informant had reported
to the Utah officers in April, more than two months previously, that an informant had
bought methamphetamine from Defendant at her residence. (The affiant neglected to
advise the magistrate that the April informant was being held in jail, accused of a crime,
at the time the information was obtained.) The Utah officers, according to the affidavit,
did not indicate that they had made any effort to substantiate this prior accusation and
there was no reports of any active investigation of Defendant in process at the time that
the search warrant was requested.2
13. Utah officers obtained and executed a No-Knock, Nighttime Search warrant
of Defendant's residence. When the Utah officers arrived at Defendant's residence, it
was unoccupied. The Utah officers commenced their search at 18:32 hours and remained
until 22:32 hours. Sundown on the day of execution, 7th of June, 2002, was at 8:59 (See
Appendix J ) o'clock p.m. Based on the evidence of controlled substances discovered in

2

This lack of follow-up investigation finds support in the officers notes of the
incident found in the Appendix.
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the search, criminal charges were filed.
14. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the fruits of the search warrant was
ultimately denied by the District Court and a conviction resulted, that conviction being as
a result of a negotiation whereby Defendant entered pleas to the following charges as
amended:
Count 1: A Third Degree Felony of possession or use of a controlled
schedule two substance, methamphetamine
Count 2: A Class B Misdemeanor, possession or use of a schedule
one controlled substance, less than one ounce of marijuana (See Appendix D)
15. Defendant entered a plea of Guilty on the 4th day of October , 2001
reserving the right to appeal from the court's order denying Defendant's Motion To
Suppress the Evidence seized from Defendant's home pursuant to the search warrant
contested here.
16. The Court having received and considered a Pre-Sentence report imposed
judgment and sentence on the 13th day of December, 2001, whereby the Defendant was
sentenced, pursuant to that conviction, to serve not more than five years in the Utah State
Penitentiary. That sentence was stayed in favor of probation and the Defendant was
ordered placed on probation with Adult Parole and Probation under specified terms and
conditions including the specific requirement that Defendant serve 30 days in the Rich
County Jail without work release and pay a fine in the amount of $800.00, which fine
included the statutory surcharge. Defendant was further required to enroll in and
9
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complete counseling through Bear River Alcohol and Drug and to pay all fees assessed
in connection therewith. In addition to the specified terms the Defendant was to conform
to standard conditions of probation. The Class B Misdemeanor was sentenced to be
served concurrently. The court stayed imposition of the sentences pending appeal. (See
Appendix E)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
17. The issues were adequately preserved for appeal by the Defendant
filing a Motion to Suppress Evidence, and upon denial thereof, entering a conditional
plea prior to trial.
18. That the trial court in this case erred in denying Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence is apparent upon review of the actions of the issuing magistrate. The
affidavits and information submitted for the issuance of the search warrant failed to
assert sufficient probable cause supporting any contention that contraband or evidence of
a crime would be found in Defendant's residence. The affidavits contained nothing more
than "bare bones' allegations obtained from a confidential informant without any basis
for imputing reliability or trustworthiness to those allegations.
19. The Utah officers uncritically accepted the information provided by the
Wyoming officers without verification and made no attempt to corroborate the
information provided by the Wyoming officers nor did those officers attempt to verify
that the allegation made by the Utah informant months prior to Appellant's Wyoming
arrest was reliable.

Nothing presented to the magistrate corroborated the report made by
10
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the Wyoming officer or the representation of the Utah informant that Defendant was
selling methamphetamine from her residence.
20. Given the fact that these were cbare bones' allegations, this information is
excluded from the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court as a part of the 4th Amendment jurisprudence propounded by that
Court.
21. The warrant was facially defective in that the mandate of the statute was
violated and no justification was provided therein which would provide support for the
issuance or execution of the No-Knock, Night Search execution of the search warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PLEA OF GUILTY, ADEQUATELY RESERVED THE ISSUES
NOW ON APPEAL
22. The Application for Certificate of Probable Cause,(See Appendix F) filed
with the Court on the 13th day of December, 2001 at the time of Sentencing and as
accepted by the court is established by the Transcript of the proceeding had on the 4th day
of October, 2001. At page 7, the Defendant "...[pleaded] guilty conditionally to the
charges
on which she is to be sentenced", and thereby reserved her right to appeal. In State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals held that conditional
pleas are permissible in Utah even in the absence of any statute or rule authorizing them.
11
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The Court approved the Sery holding by adopting a rule permitting conditional pleas,
provided that the Defendant reserves in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion and
further providing that a defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw
the guilty plea; Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1!(/).
23. The Defendant contends that the issues on appeal were adequately preserved
by entry of a conditional plea and the same appearing on the record.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE SEARCH
WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
24. The protection for citizens of the United States against unlawful search and
seizures requires that the judgement of an impartial and detached judicial officer be
interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen.
The judicial officer must judge and "not serve merely as a rubber-stamp for the police"
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897(1984). The magistrates judgment must be based
upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the
probability that it will yield the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. A search
warrants must be supported by probable cause sufficient to satisfy the mandates of the
Fourth Amendment. When the police used an unknown, unproven informant with little
or no corroboration to justify the search of a suspect's home it was held in United States
v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116,121 ( 4th Cir. 52. 1996)citing Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573,
12
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585 (1980) that such an affidavit falls short of providing probable cause. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution3 provides the right of privacy in one's
home, " is a most important interest protected by the Fourth Amendment and a
continuing theme in constitutional jurisprudence" Pay ton v. New York( Supra). In
determining whether probable cause is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant, the
magistrate "is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying the hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." U.S.v. Tuten 240
F.3d 1292 (10th Cir 2001) citing Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed 2d 527(1983).
25. In reviewing the probable cause determination of the District Court, the
standard is whether, "under the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for such a determination." GatesfSupra) at 238-39.
Such a review is not conducted de novo State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952,956 (Utah App.
1993Vciting State v.Collard 810 P.2d 884, 885(Utah App), cert. Denied, 817 P.2d
327(Utah 1991)) and the affidavit is to be considered exclusive to that end and must be
considered "in its entirety." State v. PotteriSupra) at page 954.(citing State v. Anderson,

3

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
13
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701 P.2d 1099, 1102(Utah 1985).
26. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in reviewing a warrant, the
considerations of the informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are
significant factors in the probable cause determination. However, it was said, "a
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip,
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." Illinois v.
Gates (Supra) at page 213 (1983).
27. In the case at bar, the search warrant affidavit fails in that the allegations
therein are insufficient to establish any of the necessary elements preliminary to a
determination of probable cause. First, Defendant contends that the affidavit lacks a
coherent nexus between the perceived evidence in Wyoming of wrongdoing and the
existing conditions at Defendant's residence, which nexus would establish a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found there. Second, the
affidavit failed to provide any indicia of veracity or reliability, or to disclose a rational
basis of knowledge by the informants. Third, the affidavit failed because it was so
incomplete as to violate the statute in Utah Code Annotated 77-23-205(1), and provided
no basis for a No-Knock, Night Search warrant, which warrant is essentially what the
Utah officer executed without that justification.
A. The affidavit failed to establish reasonable grounds to
Believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found
at Defendant's residence.
28. The affidavit in the case at bar did not provide the magistrate with any rational
14
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basis for drawing a reasonable inference that a search of Defendant's residence would
disclose evidence of criminal activity. "Probable cause undoubtedly requires a nexus
between suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched." U.S. v. Danhauer, 229
F.3d 1002,1006 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing U. S. v. Coral-Corral 899 F.2d 927,937 (10th Cir.
1990).
29. At the time of Defendant's arrest in Lincoln County, Wyoming Defendant had
not been convicted of any crime and had, only at that moment, become a subject of an
investigation by the Utah Police. Assuming, without admitting, the fact that Defendant
was under investigation, that fact, standing alone provided no nexus that would further an
indication that contraband or evidence of criminal activity might be located in her
residence. State v. Potteri Supra) at pg. 956 (See State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640,644(Utah
App.)(holding that information that defendant had been a target of investigations by local
drug agencies during the past several years does nothing to indicate that controlled
substances will currently be found at his residence). No exigent circumstances intervened
in that Defendant was incarcerated and held incommunicado at the time of the execution
of the search warrant and there was no reason expressed to the point that Defendant or
that any agent of Defendant might destroy, carry away or tamper with any evidence
located at her residence.
30. Defendant's residence in Randolph was referred to only twice in the affidavit
of Officer Stacey, once in reference to an allegation by an informant that he had twice
bought drugs from Defendant's trailer months previously; and once by reference to a
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statement attributed to Defendant by Wyoming police officers that Defendant had
stopped at her residence before continuing to Wyoming. Interestingly, information
known to the officer at the time he made his affidavit directly contradicted the purported
confession of Defendant.4 Neither reference either by itself or as taken together provided
sufficient evidence for any reasonable belief that contraband or evidence of criminal
activity would be found at Defendant's residence.
31. The Court in U.S. v. Danhauer illustrated a similar deficiency in the search
warrant affidavit. In that case, the police received a tip from a confidential informant
that the accused were cooking methamphetamine in the garage of the residence. The
detective on the case attempted to corroborate the tip by reviewing the criminal records
of the accused, by verifying the physical address and ownership of the residence, and by
observing activity occurring in the vicinity of the home. U.S. v. Danhauer, (Supra) at
page 1002,1004. The detective noted, as corroboration in his affidavit, facts that a
criminal background check revealed that one of the suspects had tested positive for
methamphetamine and opiates in a recent urine analysis. Id. The reviewing Court ruled
that despite the efforts of the detective:
'The detective made little attempt to link methamphetamine to the Danhauer residence.
...The only possible nexus between Danhauer's residence and the alleged criminal
activity was his wife's urinalysis result. This is not the type of evidence that enables the
state magistrate to draw a reasonable inference that the items subject to the search

4

In Officer Stacey's report dated 6/14/00, he relates, "On June 6, Officer Clark
asked me if our officers could watch for Dable
We did not see Dable in Randolph that
evening." (See Appendix H)
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warrant would be located at Danhauer's residence. Such a nebulous connection does not
give a magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Id. at
1006.
32. Important similarities as well as important differences exist between the
Danhauer affidavit and the affidavit in the case at bar. One of the significant differences
is that the detective in Danhauer made some attempt to corroborate an otherwise
unverifiable informant tip with an independent investigation, the evidence of which he
included in the affidavit. The officer in the case at bar made no such attempts either after
receiving the remote tip about drug sales from Defendant's residence or after the
communication from Wyoming officers two months later. The tip received by the Utah
officer in April was conclusory in nature, a naked averment of sale of drugs from
Defendant's home; the tip didn't provide enough evidence to establish probable cause in
April nor did it draw added strength as a result of the occurrence in June. Utah officers
made no efforts to investigate immediately after they received the April tip and what
amounted to inconsequential corroboration in June constituted, at best, a "nebulous
connection" as disapproved in Danhauer.
33. The remainder of the affidavit in the case at bar amounts to nothing more than
inept and inappropriate attempts to make more "nebulous connections" between drug
sales and the Defendant's home. The Utah officer made what appears to be transparent
attempts to "cut and paste" irrelevant and uncorroborated statements together in an effort
to establish probable cause. Utah officers attempted to use the information relayed from
Wyoming officers taken from a Wyoming informant, but the only possibly relevant
17
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information gained was the admission from Defendant that she had stopped at her home
before her arrest. Because the Wyoming officers had confiscated the drugs Defendant
admittedly bought in Ogden, Utah they being the same drugs described by the Wyoming
informant as being under contract of delivery , there was no surviving reason to believe
that the subject drugs were at Defendant's residence or that Defendant would ultimately
be selling those drugs from her residence. The other allegations within the affidavit make
no reference to Defendant's residence.
34. The affidavit in the case at bar, not unlike the affidavit in Danhauer,
inappropriately relies on statements without substance to persuade a magistrate to any
reasonable inference that contraband or evidence of criminal activity would be disclosed
upon a search of the Defendant's residence.
B. The affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to
establish the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge for
each of the informants in the affidavit.
35. Of the several informants named in the affidavit, the affidavit failed to provide
any veracity and/or reliability and/or the basis of knowledge for any one of those
informants. In Unites States v. SturmoskL 971 F.2d 452,457 (10th Cir. 1992) the
reviewing court said, "When there is sufficient independent corroboration of an
informant's information, there is no need to establish the veracity of the informant." In
the case at bar, there was no independent corroboration recited in the affidavit and
therefore, the veracity and basis for knowledge of the informants is indispensable to the
determination of probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing
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Illinois v. Gates (Supra) at page 213,238. Let us now discuss each of the informants
separately.
1. ThrellOrton
36. The affidavit in the case at bar recites that "Threll Orton informed your
affiant that he had bought methamphetamine from Laura Dable at the trailer described in
this affidavit on at least two occasions." (See Appendix G). In addition to omission of
the relative time frame, no corroborating evidence for this statement is recited in the
affidavit. It is totally insupportable that within the affidavit no dates are supplied as to
when the informant disclosed this information, or as to when the officer received this
information, nor is any background supplied in the affidavit as to the circumstances
under which the officer obtained the information. The affidavit reveals nothing about
Threll Orton except his name and his uncorroborated allegation of buying drugs at
Defendant's trailer. Interestingly, information known to the officer at the time he made
his affidavit directly contradicts what was written in the affidavit, as related in the Deputy
report dated 6/14/00, " Back in April, a man named Threll Orton ... He told me that he
had gotten the Methamphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura".
(emphasis mine) (See Appendix H)
37. In addition to the discrepancies noted above, the affidavit provides no
indication that any informant has provided reliable information in the past. There is
nothing to indicate that the informant was advised that a prosecution for providing false
information might ensue or that the informant gave the information in a sworn
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statement. A reasonable magistrate would have no basis for relying on a statement from
an unknown person at an unknown date, without some factual explanation linking the
remote statement to the affidavit provided to the magistrate two months later. Most
importantly the magistrate was not advised that the informant was under arrest at the time
of the disclosures. This was not the case where a disinterested citizen supplied the
information.
38. The affidavit reports that the Wyoming officers confiscated the drugs that
Defendant admittedly bought in Ogden, Utah, hence the evidence at that point directly
contradicted Threll Orton's April implication that Defendant ever sold drugs from her
home. The circumstances of the confiscation of the drugs, if disclosed, would tend to
rebut any implication of Defendant's sale of drugs from her home. The remote
information given to Utah police by Threll Orton would have thereby been likely
excluded from consideration with respect to the affidavit because after the drugs were
confiscated, what was alleged by Orton was thereby contradicted and became suspect.
State v. Potter (Supra) at page 952,957 (citing State v. Brown 798 P.2d 284,288 (Ut. App.
1990).
39. Threll Orton's statement is the only possible inference in the affidavit that
tends to connect the residence of the Defendant with criminal activity and as such it
required independent corroborative evidence or , in the alternative, indicia of informant's
veracity and reliability. As seen in the affidavit, the statement imputed to Orton stands
alone without any dates or circumstances clothing the provided information with
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reliability and without clothing the informant with credibility.(See Appendix G ) Striking
similarities exist between the affidavit in the case at bar and the affidavit in the previously
analyzed Danhauer case. In Danhauer, the Court ruled that such information, without
more, is insufficient, observing that:
w

The affidavit contains repetitive statements regarding physical description of the
Danhauer residence and the identity of the occupants. Further, the affidavit contains
statements about the criminal histories of both Dennis and Robbi Danhauer. The
affidavit does not reveal, however, the informant's basis of knowledge or adequately
verify the informant's basis of knowledge or adequately verify the informant's most
serious allegation, that the Danhauers were manufacturing methamphetamine. An
affidavit replete with repetitive and tenuous facts does not provide the magistrate with a
sufficient basis for drawing a reasonable inference that a search would uncover evidence
of criminal activity.". U.S. v. Danhauer, (Supra) at 1002,1006.
40. Appellant suggests that the affidavit in the case at bar is made entirely of
"repetitive and tenuous facts" where the form affidavit allows space for evidence of the
reliability of the informants, facts corroborating, or past reliable statements (See
Appendix G ), the officer recites:
"Threll Orton told your affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura
Dable, the person living in the described trailer. Dable was arrested in Lincoln County,
Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of methamphetamine and marijuana."
41. One is compelled to ask uso what'? The affidavit then provides a space in the
probable cause section for facts of the case, how they were observed, the date at which
they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant, the response:
" Threll Orton informed your affiant that he had bought methamphetamine from
Laura Dable at the trailer described in this affidavit on at least two occasions.
On 6/7/00 I spoke with Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner from the Lincoln
County Sheriffs Office. They indicated that they were working on a drug case, and that
a confidential informant told them that Laura Dable was planning on picking up some
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drugs in Ogden on 6/6/00 and bring them into Lincoln County to sell. On 6/7/00, Dable
was stopped and her vehicle searched. The officers located approximately 4 ounces of
Marijuana and 4 grams of methamphetamine.
Dable informed officers that she had bought the drugs in Ogden on 6/6/00 and had
stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours before going on up to Lincoln
County. Your affiant feels there is probable cause to believe some of the drugs bought in
Ogden were left in the trailer because there have allegedly been sales made from the
trailer to people in this county."(See Appendix G)
42. The bulk of the information in the probable cause section is not relevant to
alleged criminal activity at Defendant's residence and the one insupportable statement
attributed to Threll Orton, which is repeated a significant number of times without any
corroborative evidence and without support for the implied veracity or reliability of the
informant, is clearly insufficient to provide any reasonable basis for the belief that
criminal activity might be ongoing at Defendant's home.
43. Appellant submits that the last line of the affidavit modifies the entire
narrative and causes the same to fall grossly short of probable cause standards. It is
contended that what the affiant "feels" is irrelevant, and reference to alleged sales to
people is unsurpassed in the annals of vagueness and nonspecificity. One may only
conclude that the search of Defendant's residence was based on a "feeling" which relied
on an unfounded report of nonspecific "sales" to unknown "people". Interestingly, the
search result itself did not provide support for the informants contention as to sales but
only tended to establish that personal drug use had occurred on the premises. The
totality of the circumstances as recited in the subscribed to affidavit falls far short of
establishing probable cause for the search of Defendant's residence and at best amounts

22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to a 'leap of faith" by the attesting officer.
2. The Wyoming Informant
44. The unnamed Wyoming informant, according to the affidavit, alleged that
Defendant was planning on buying drugs in Ogden to sell in Lincoln County. Because
this informant's statements are not relevant to the existence of probable cause to search
Defendant's residence, the statements attributed to that confidential informant will not
be addressed in detail. This Court should note, however, that the affidavit provided no
amplifying information about the informant. Nothing in the affidavit demonstrated the
reliability or veracity of the informant's disclosure. The information regarding the
Wyoming informant was of the "bare bones" variety disapproved in United States v Leon
(Supra) at 897. (See also U. S. v.Danhauer (Supra) "the affidavit contained bare-bones
allegations obtained from a confidential informant"
3. Wyoming Officers (Kim Clark and Jody Gardner)
45. The information relayed by the Wyoming officers, largely heresay on heresay,
had nothing to do with evidence of a crime at Defendant's residence. The information
provided by the Wyoming officers established only that Defendant had been arrested
pursuant to the Wyoming informant's tip and that the drugs that Defendant bought in
Ogden had been confiscated. The admission by Defendant that she had stopped at her
home before her arrest adds nothing of value to the Utah affidavit. The Wyoming
officers did not relay any corroboration that would implicate Defendant's residence. The
inclusion of their testimony in the affidavit was inappropriately relied upon as a basis for
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probable cause, most importantly, those informant officers, within the affidavit, were not
clothed with either veracity or reliability.
46. In Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410(1969), the court stated, "The past
reliability of the informant can no more furnish probable cause for believing his current
report than can previous experience with the officer himself. Illinois v. Gatesf Supra) at
Footnote 8, we compare Stanley v. State, 19 Md App., at 530, 313 A.2d, at 861,
"reasoning that "[e]ven assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge
[magistrate] still may not accept the bare conclusion... of a sworn and known and trusted
police-affiant [informant]." The Trial Judge specifically held, at page 3 ^ 6 of the
FINDINGS AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE (See Appendix I ) that "Enforcement Officers even if said officer or officers
were not known to the affiant need no other verification or other indicia of reliability and
may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant was a Peace
Officer." The District Court clearly errored in its specific holding.
C. There was no justification for the execution of a No-Knock
Night search warrant.
47. The Night Search and No Knock sections within the affidavit form are left
blank. In what appears to be the inexplicable rush to obtain the search warrant, both the
magistrate and the affiant failed to even address these sections within the affidavit or
within the search warrant. It was, therefore, nothing less than unconscionable that the
Utah Officers entered Defendant's home unannounced and remained there until after
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dark. As might be expected when the officers arrived, the trailer was unoccupied, the
officer having knowledge that Defendant was, at that time, incarcerated in Wyoming.
Utah officers began execution of the search warrant at approximately 6:32 pm and
remained in Defendant's residence until approximately 10:16pm going through
Defendant's personal items. The times as related to the search warrant execution are
disputed by neither Appellant nor Appellee.
D. The actions of the Utah Officers in the execution of the
Warrant do not satisfy the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule.
48. In the United States v. Leon (Supra), the Supreme Court of the United States
held that evidence obtained by "officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate"(emphasis mine) is admissible. The Court pointed out
that "officers" should be read broadly to include those who obtain the warrant as well as
those who conduct the search and that the "officers" must act based upon an "objectively
reasonable" reliance. The Court acknowledged," [that] in some circumstances the officer
will have no reasonable ground for believing that the warrant was properly issued." Id. at
922-23 & n. 24. In that footnote , the Court noted that an officer could not obtain a
warrant on the basis of a "bare bones" affidavit and then rely on colleagues, who are
ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained, to conduct the
search.
49. In Leon, the Court noted that the judicially carved good-faith exceptions may
not be applied in four situations: (1) If the magistrate is misled by information in the
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affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard for the truth. Id- At 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57
L.Ed.2d 677, 98 S Ct. 2674 (1978)); (2) If the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role. Id. (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 422 U.S. 319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, 99
S. Ct. 2319 (1979)); (3) If the affidavit does not provide the magistrate with a substantial
basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 at 610-11, 45 L.Ed.2d. 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)); (4) If the warrant is so
facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id.
(See, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984)).
50. Appellant contends that, in the case at bar, this Court should not, anymore
than did the District Court; apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
because, with respect to the affidavit in question, all four situations noted in the Leon
opinion come into play. The affiant, in reckless disregard for the truth failed to note the
circumstances whereby he garnered disclosures from informants. In two instances both
the Utah informant and the Wyoming Informant were under arrest during the time that
the information was provided and could not be treated as disinterested citizens.
51. In this case, it is patently apparent that the issuing magistrate did not act as
anything other than a "rubber stamp" in approving the skeletal affidavit without change
and this fact alone suggests that the magistrate acted in a manner not consistent with his
role as a neutral and detached judicial officer. See United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d
116, 121 (4thCir. 52. 1996).
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52. Appellant next contends that the "bare bones" nature of the affidavit is such
that it is apparent that no magistrate reasonably within a judicial role could find a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. See also. United
States v. Jackson. 818 F.2d. 345 (5th Cir. 1987) (the Court there found the affidavit to be
"bare bones" and incapable of supporting a finding of probable cause); United States v.
Barrington, 806 F.2d. 529 (5th Cir. 1987) was to the same effect.
53. With significant portions of the "form affidavit" left incomplete the challenged
warrant is defective on its face and no executing officer would therein find sufficient
instruction upon which the warrant could be properly and conscientiously executed. Utah
Code 77-23-205(1) provides: "The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it
be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause
to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case he may
insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night..." Utah Code 77-23201(1) & (2) provides," (1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at
10 p.m. local time. (2) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of
the state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, or
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought
before the magistrate." In reviewing the affidavit objectively, two undisputable facts
exist (1) A good portion of the affidavit is left blank; and (2) The written comments
amount to nothing more than a series of repetitive statements. The affidavit could only
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be described as "facially deficient." The most detail in the affidavit is that of Defendant's
trailer, which detail stand for nothing if the affiant fails to establish a connection between
Defendant's trailer and evidence of wrongdoing. No information regarding the
informants is provided nor is any independent corroboration of informant disclosures
listed nor is attention given to the No Knock, Night Search strictures as applied by
Utah Law evident within the body of the warrant. (See Appendix G )
54. From whatever the source, the information presented must be sufficient to
allow the magistrate to independently determine probable cause: "his action cannot be a
mere ratification for the bare conclusions of another. "Gates,(Supra at 239.) Likewise, a
conscientious peace officer is left without sufficient guidance to execute the warrant that
has come into his hands. Accordingly, given the information presented in the affidavit,
and as apparent on the face of the warrant the facts of this case do not merit the
application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
The privacy and protection of hearth and home is a fundamental right. Even in the
more rural parts of this nation, where "everybody knows everybody" and certain
formalities, legal and otherwise, are oft-times overlooked; any application of a state
officer to enter into a private residence must be rigorously scrutinized. Strict standards
for the establishment of probable cause are in place for the protection of private
residences , particularly from law enforcement with a "feeling" that evidence of
wrongdoing will be found. These protections are in place regardless of whether or not
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the "hunch" of law enforcement ultimately is supported by the fruits of the improvident
search.
Based upon the foregoing facts and argumeflftMDefendant Laura Dable respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the order denying the motion to suppress the search of
Dable's residence, and remand this to the trial courrfor withdrawal of Dable's guilty plea
and for further proceeding not inconsistent with this\court\s opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 26

•Jjulo 2G. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record,
proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides t h a t
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
(1) (a) Ail appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
arrest ofjudgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice
shall be filed with the court.
fb) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another
appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails
to appear for oral argument.
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided.
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate, brief. Appellant
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's
brief.
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing
v.\t! a-.; unitary circuui.-Ljia.-s »•• aiiaviung an txUtii.sioii.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief.
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination.
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be entertained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted,
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Rule 26

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or ^
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
":$M
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and t h ^ i l
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatical!^!
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the?il
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by tV.J ' "
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
Supreme Court.
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit courts made
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil appeals.
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district
court or juvenile court under this rule.
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered
in the justice court under this rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit court. The decision of the
circuit court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance is raked ici the justice court;
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court
shall transmit to the circuit court a certified copy of the docket, the original pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and
the notice and undertaking on appeal;
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah
Rules of Court [Criminal! Procedure; or
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit court, including any process required to enforce judgment.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, U»89, added "whether
by verdict or plea" to the end of Subsection
'2ifa); delated "or" from the end of Subsection
iMHd), ;u]«ied t!cr!! to the end of Subsection
01'to», and added Subsection (3)>0; substituted
"may" for "can" in the second sentence of Subsection (4Kb); divided Subsections i6) and
ii-i'-a) into two sentences by deleting "and";
divided Subsection (8) into Subsections (8)(a)
through (8Kc); substituted ''made" tov ''promulgated" in Subsection (11); added "Utah Rules of
Court Procedure; or" to the olid of Subsection
(13hc»; and made minor stylistic changes
throughout the rule.
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — This rule governs appeals from district, circuit, and juvenile courts.
The practice aud procedure for taking such appeals, including tbe time in which the appeal is
filed, are prescribed by the Utah Rules of Appe! 1 ate Pruccd tire.

The reference in Subsection «';:}•(<-< io the
"Utah Rules of Court Procedure" is apparently
intended as a reference to the Rules of Criminal !Vtv:,'duro.
C r o s s References. — Appeals r.o Court of
Appeals, § 78-4-11.
Appeals from justice's court to circuit court,
§ 78-5-120.
Appellate jurisdiction oi'disirici courts, IJtuh
Const., An. VII!, Sec. 5; y 78-3-4.
Appellate jurisdiction of Suptome Court,
LHah Const., Art. v'lil, Sec. 3; § 7S-'J-2.
I:'
Dismissal if affidavit <:f imeecuni'v
untrue, § 21-7-7.
Judicial Council. Utah Const., Ait. VI!l. Se«.
12.
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah COP:-!
Art. I, See. 12; $ 77-1 e.
Kight of indujeni accused to vo^i^-A o : : a;:
peal, § 77-:)2-i el s^q.
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(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to. a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a i
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance *i
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
j
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Noveny j
ber 1,2001.)
1
Advisory Committee Note. — These
amendments are intended to reflect current law
without any substantive changes. The addition
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis
in section (eX4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and
is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State
v. Breckenridge, 688 R2d 440 (Utah 1983). The
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the

factual basis required for those pleas. E.g' I
Wdlett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992).
The amendments explicitly recognize that J
plea affidavits, where used, may properly be |
incorporated into the record when the trial 1
court determines that the defendant has read j
(or been read) the affidavit, understands its j
contents, and acknowledges the contents. State A
v. Maguire, 830 R2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper I
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the |

1
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
b * (c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of
misdemeanor; and
^"Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprison(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
ment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if
third degree felony.
'- the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
*"• 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intenin his immediate possession during the commission or in
tionally:
: furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
distribution of a controlled substance a license numI consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
r additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterto another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
' minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repreand not concurrently.
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth#K (d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au*; (iXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
thorized person;
'imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
t- seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
' execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per& person is not eligible for probation.
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
(a) It is unlawful:
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
•
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deceptt
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ*ta from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
\y
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
false name or address;
r
P "'• this chapter;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
£* "
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
t;
\ " control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
Pf' aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
!*•
possessing, using, or distributing controlled subplate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
W
stances in any of those locations; or
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
£*
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
f^*" possess an altered or forged prescription or written
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
|£
order for a controlled substance.
counterfeit controlled substance.
W' (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa)
j*(2XaXi) with respect to:
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
0 j is guilty of a second degree felony;
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
,
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mariperson not authorized under this chapter who commits
Jn)? juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
g|.
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
guilty of a third degree felony; or
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
|g..
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
i)>
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com|v9*. the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
mitted:
gts•> ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
Ejjj (c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
p(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
Mceupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
||64«13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
those schools or institutions;
lahallbe sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, staprovided in Subsection (2)(b).
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
MMd) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possestime of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
W o n of any controlled substance by a person, that person
by or through a school or institution under Subsecg ™ H he sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
tions (4)(aXi) and (ii);
Mmded in this Subsection (2).
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
Pjfe) Any person who violates Subsection (2Xa)(i) with
facility;
fffcpect to all other controlled substances not included in
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
gabeection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
recreation center;
KJjnice of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
• W o n a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
PMBdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
or structure adjacent thereto;
E&e person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
ifcjv ^ ^ person convicted of violating Subsection
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
ffi/feXii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
E*<
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde(viii); or
m meanor;
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Jpq-r ( c ) Any person who h a s been convicted of a violation of
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) m a y be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate t e r m as provided by law, but if
Jjp the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
¥ in his immediate possession during the commission or in
W furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally
I sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
p consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
jtf* additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterr* minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
jti and not concurrently.
fo&- (d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
gft (IXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
fe- imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which m a y be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
F * (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if t h e marijuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more t h a n one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
jj< (c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
•$(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
• O c c u p i e d by any correctional facility as defined in Section
K 6 4 - 1 3 - 1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
p t h a l l be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b).
P (d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posseston of any controlled substance by a person, t h a t person
*«*U be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
[^Provided ^ t n i s Subsection (2).
(•) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
R ™ P e c t to all other controlled substances not included in
Jjjjrtfcection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
SJjjnce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
jVpon a second conviction t h e person is guilty of a class A
W8demeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
^ P e r s o n is guilty of a third degree felony.
M) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;

58-37-8

(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
(viii); or
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77-18-17. Retroactive application.
The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply
retroactively to all arrests and convictions regardless of the
date on which the arrests were made or convictions were
entered.
1994

Section
77-19-6.
77-19-7.
77-19-8.

CHAPTER 18a

77-19-9.

THE A P P E A L
Section
77-18a-l.
77-18a-2.

77-19-10.
Appeals — When proper.
Capital cases.

77-19-11.

77-18a-l. A p p e a l s — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict
or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the
substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate court decides the appeal would be in
the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by
reason of a mental disease or defect incompetent to
proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal
of a felony information following a refusal to bind the
defendant over for trial;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any
part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the
appellate court decides that the appeal would be in the
interest of justice;
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order
under subsection (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant
over for trial on a felony as charged or a pretrial order
dismissing or quashing in part a felony information, when
upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty or no contest.
1997
77-18a-2. Capital cases.
After the resolution of an initial appeal of a capital case
when the sentence of death has been imposed, a subsequent
appeal may not be entertained by any court and a stay of
execution of the sentence may not be granted when the appeal
does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or when
the new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
1990

CHAPTER 19
THE EXECUTION
Section
77-19-1.
77-19-2.
77-19-3.
77-19-4.
77-19-5.

Judgment for fine or costs — Enforcement.
Judgment of imprisonment — Commitment.
Special release from city or county jail — Purposes.
Special release from city or county jail — Conditions and limitations.
Special release from city or county jail — Revocation.

77-19-12.
77-19-13.

Judgment of death — Warrant — Delivery
warrant — Determination of execution time'
Judgment of death — Statement to Board oil
Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death, when suspended, and W
whom.
4
Judgment of death not executed — Order for
execution.
Judgment of death — Location and procedure!
for execution.
Who may be present — Photographic and record*
ing equipment.
Return upon death warrant.
Incompetency or pregnancy of person sentenced
to death — Procedures.

77-19-1. Judgment for fine or costs — Enforcement
If the judgment is for afineor costs when allowed by statute
and the fine is not paid as ordered by the court, execution or
garnishment may be issued as on a judgment in a civil action.
The prosecuting attorney, upon written request of the court
clerk, shall effectuate collection through execution or garnish*
ment when the fine or costs have not been paid as ordered by
the court.
iset
77-19-2. Judgment of imprisonment — Commitment 4
If the judgment is for imprisonment, the sheriff of the •
county or other appropriate custodial officer designated by the
court shall, upon receipt of a certified copy of the judgment,
deliver the defendant to the warden of the state prison or
keeper of the jail. Such custodial officer shall also deliver a
certified copy of the judgment and take a receipt from the
warden or keeper of the jail for the defendant and return it to
the court.
1980
77-19-3. Special release from city or county jail —
Purposes.
Any person sentenced to a term in any city or county jail
may, pursuant to order of the sentencing judge, be released
from jail during those hours which are reasonable and necessary to accomplish any of the following purposes:
'
(1) Working at his employment;
(2) Performing essential household duties;
(3) Attending an educational institution;
(4) Obtaining necessary medical treatment; or
(5) Any other proper purpose the court may order.
I960

77-19-4. Special release from city or county jail —
Conditions and limitations.
All released prisoners, while absent from the jail, are in the
custody of the jailer and subject at any time to being returned
to jail, if good cause appears for so doing. The judge shall
specify the terms and conditions of the release time which may
include, but are not limited to the following:
(1) The prisoner may be required to pay all monies
earned from employment during the jail term to those
persons he is legally responsible to support; or
(2) He may be required to pay a reasonable amount for
the expenses of his maintenance in the jail but may be
permitted to retain sufficient money to pay his costs of
transportation, meals, and other incidental and necessary
expenses.
*
During all hours when the prisoner is not serving the
function for which he is awarded release time, he shall be
confined to jail. The prisoner shall be responsible for obtaining
his own transportation to and from the place where he
198
performs the function for which he is released.
*
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of fingerprints for the purpose of conducting a national criminal history background check.
(2) Fingerprints of applicants for admission to the Utah
State Bar shall be submitted to the Department of Public
Safety, Bureau of Criminal Identification to be used to conduct
a criminal history background check and to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to obtain a national criminal history
background check.
(3) The criminal history background information obtained
from the Department of Public Safety and the national criminal history background information obtained from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this section may be used
by the Utah State Bar to determine an applicant's character,
fitness, and suitability for admission to the Utah State Bar.
2001

78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. A p p e l l a t e court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
1986
78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.
78-2a-6.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc.

78-2a-3

(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) line Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
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magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be
called a duplicate original warrant and shall be deemed a
warrant for purposes of this chapter. In these cases the
magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant.
The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of
the duplicate original warrant on the face of the original
warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the
original warrant shall be in conformity with this chapter.
Upon return, the magistrate shall require the person who
gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds
for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript.
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a
search warrant.
1998
77-23-205. Time for service — Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in t h e warrant
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it be
served any time of the day or night. An officer may request
other persons to assist him in conducting the search.
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or
magistrate as not executed.
1994
77-23-206. R e c e i p t for p r o p e r t y t a k e n .
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a search
warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person from whom it
was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person is
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where
he found the property. Failure to give or leave a receipt shall
not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial.
1994
77-23-207. Return — I n v e n t o r y of property t a k e n .
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly
make a verified return of the warrant to the magistrate and
deliver a written inventory of anything seized, stating the
place where it is being held.
1994
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that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall
so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted
or that physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given.
i^
77-23-211. Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances — Warrants to
obtain evidence.
In addition to other warrants provided by this chapter
magistrates, upon a showing of probable cause to believe a
state, county, or city law or ordinance, has been violated in
relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may
issue a warrant for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a
violation. Warrants may be obtained from a magistrate upon
request of peace officers and state, county, and municipal
health, fire, building, and animal control personnel only after
approval by a prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued
under this section shall be directed to any peace officer within
the county where the warrant is to be executed, who shall
serve the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany
the officer.
1994
77-23-212. Evidence seized pursuant to warrant not
excluded unless unlawful search or seizure
substantial — "Substantial" defined.
(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be suppressed at a motion, trial, or other
proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of the peace officer is
shown to be substantial.
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered
substantial and in bad faith if the warrant was obtained with
malicious purpose and without probable cause or was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the
warrant or with unnecessary severity.
1997
C H A P T E R 23a
I N T E R C E P T I O N O F COMMUNICATIONS
Section
77-23a-l.
77-23a-2.
77-23a-3.
77-23a-4.

Short title.
Legislative findings.
77-23-208. S a f e k e e p i n g of property.
Definitions.
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its
Offenses
— Criminal and civil — Lawful
safekeeping and maintenance until the court otherwise orinterception.
ders.
1994
77-23a-5.
Traffic in intercepting devices — Offenses —
77-23-209. Return of p a p e r s t o district court.
Lawful activities.
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions and affidavits
77-23a-6.
Seizure and forfeiture of intercepting deupon which the search warrant is based, the search warrant,
vices.
the return, and the inventory. If he is without authority to
77-23a-7.
Evidence — Exclusionary rule.
proceed further with respect to the offense under which the
77-23a-8.
Court order to authorize or approve intercepwarrant was issued, he shall return them to the appropriate
tion — Procedure.
court of the county having jurisdiction within 15 days after the
return.
1994
77-23a-9.
Disclosure or use of intercepted information.
77-23a-10.
Application for order — Authority of order -7
77-23-210. Force used in e x e c u t i n g w a r r a n t — When
Emergency action — Application — Entry
notice of authority is required as a prerequi— Conditions — Extensions — Recordings
site.
— Admissibility or suppression — Appeal
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry
by state.
into any building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other
Civil remedy for unlawful interception —
enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use such 77-23a-ll.
force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
Action for relief.
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is 77-23a-12.
Enjoining a violation — Civil action by attorno response or he is not admitted with reasonable promptney general.
ness; or
77-23a-13.
Installation of device when court order re(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the
quired — Penalty.
magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant
77-23a-14.
Court order for installation — Application.
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(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other means of informing approaching motorists that they must stop and directing them to the
place to stop;
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the
establishment of the checkpoint; and
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint;
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that the plan appropriately:
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will
be delayed;
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or
inquiry;
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist
will experience;
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the individual enforcement officers operating
the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the
enforcement officers; and
(c) the administrative traffic checkpoint has the primary purpose of inspecting, verifying, or detecting:
(i) drivers that may be under the influence of
alcohol or drugs;
(ii) license plates, registration certificates, insurance certificates, or driver licenses;
(iii) violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code
of Utah; or
(iv) other circumstances that are specifically distinguishable by the magistrate from a general interest in crime control.
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan
meets the requirements of Subsection (2), the magistrate shall
sign the authorization and issue it to the command level
officer, retaining a copy for the court's file.
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be
issued to the checkpoint command level officer participating in
the operation of the checkpoint.
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of
the checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the plan.
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any
motorist who h a s been stopped at the checkpoint upon request
of the motorist.
2001

77-23-104.5. Signs —- Prohibitions.
An enforcement officer may not display a sign that notifies
motorists of a n administrative traffic checkpoint unless t h e
checkpoint is being operated under the authority of a magistrate a s provided in Section 77-23-104.
2001

77-23-105. Failure to stop — Criminal liability.
Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, without stopping as required, any administrative traffic checkpoint operated under the authority of a magistrate as provided
in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1992
PART 2
SEARCH WARRANTS
77-23-201. Search warrants — Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and
ending at 10 p.m. local time.
(2) "Search warrant" is a n order issued by a magistrate
in the n a m e of t h e state a n d directed to a peace officer,

77-23-204

describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by
him and brought before the magistrate.
2001

77-23-202. Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it:
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an
offense; or
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.

1994

77-23-203. Conditions precedent t o issuance.
( D A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, or
evidence to be seized.
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal
conduct, and is in the possession of a person or entity for which
there is insufficient probable cause shown to the magistrate to
believe that such person or entity is a party to the alleged
illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a
finding by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized
cannot be obtained by subpoena, or t h a t such evidence would
be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by
subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search w a r r a n t
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such
conditions t h a t reasonably afford protection of the following
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence:

(a) protection against unreasonable interference with
normal business;
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected
confidential sources of information; or
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally protected rights.
1994

77-23-204. Examination of complainant and witnesses
— Witness not in physical presence of magistrate — Duplicate original warrants — Return.
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the
issuance of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the
warrant. Any person having standing to contest the search
may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the
recorded testimony in support of the application for the
warrant.
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the
physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate
is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the
warrant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to
the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and
shall be recorded and transcribed. After transcription, the
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed with
the court. This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for
purposes of this section.
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those
required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant,
the magistrate shall require the peace officer or the
prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to
read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The
magistrate may direct that specific modifications be made
in the warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate shall
direct the peace officer or the prosecuting attorney for the
government who is requesting the warrant to sign the
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT i n
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
18
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. X I V , § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
21
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 00110027 FS
Judge Judkiois

LAURA DABLE
Defendant,

Please take notice that the Defendant Appeals the judgement of conviction and sentence
entered on 10 JXEcember, 2001 to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Dated this'*^* day of December, 2 0 0 ^

Attorney at Law

AWL/em
j p B ' K f t M *-»fc
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A. W.Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF RICH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAURA DABLE,
Defendant,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

:
Case No. 00110027 FS

FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE,
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr.
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine which provided the basis for
the Wyoming chargefroma woman in Randolph named Laura, and a description of her residence
was provided.
2. On June 6,2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clarkfromthe
Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriffs Office, Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph, Utah
Page 1 of 20
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watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer Clark
allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to Ogden to pick
up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he felt that they had
enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey stated in a June 14,
2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening.", referring to June 6,2000. l
3, On June 7,2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone callfromOfficer Clark
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to Officer
Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that she had bought
the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming
where she was arrested.
4, Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavit, a copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Officer Stacey, without assistance from the Rich County Attorney
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached hereto as Exhibit
B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to " look over", at around 6:00 p.m on June 7,2000.
5, Judge McKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled substances,
packaging material, or any type of peraphcn alia us*d vidh illegal controlled substances. The search
was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000 was at 20:59 hours.
1

All of the above data came from the notes of Officer Stacey, provide to Defendant by the
Rich County Attorney's office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISCUSSION
6. Search and seizure is a powerful tool for law enforcement but is also one of the more
intrusive and degrading of motions available to law enforcement.
7. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and affects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated..." In short, this amendment requires that authorities have
'probable cause' and obtain proper authorization before they may search the residence of any
person.. This authorization, in the form of a search warrant, must also describe in detail the place
be searched and the items that may be seized in order for the items to be admissible in a court of la
To discourage abuse and violation of the Fourth Amendment the Supreme Court of the United
States, has invoked the Exclusionary Rule; See Weeks vs United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and
Mapp vs Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule declared that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of Constitutional mandate are inadmissible in Federal court. The
exclusionary rule was likewise made applicable to State Courts procedures pursuant to operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2
ISSUES
The MOTION TO SUPPRESSfiledin this case presents several issues to the court; they
being:
POINT I:
The Informant Threll Van Orton was clothed by the Affiant with indicia of reliability which
were not warranted by the facts available to that Affiant.

2

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
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POINT II:
Indicia of the reliability of the Informant Threll Orton as presented by the AflSant are
insufficient to allow the magistrate to credit any part of the information provided.
POINT III:
There was, under the facts known to the AflSant no necessity for the Search Warrant to be
issued justifying a NIGHT SEARCH, nor did the search warrant specify whether or not the
Defendants privacy might be invaded to the extent of a Night time Search.
POINT IV:
The AflSant had no factual basis to support any contention of reliability of the informants,
Officers Kim Clark and Jody Gardner or that their unnamed informant was reliable.
POINT V:
The list of property as authorized to be seized by the search warrant is vague, non-specific.
POINT VI:
There is no factual basis recited within the Affidavit upon which the Magistrate might make a
finding of'probable cause'.
DISCUSSION
POINT I:
The Informant Threll Van Orton was clothed by the Affiant with indicia of reliability
which not warranted by the facts available to that Affiant
8. "In determining whether there is probable cause... [we] are concerned only with the
question whether the AflSant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit... for the belief
that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched;"3
9. "Similarly, inasmuch as the existence of probable cause must be established byfreshfacts,
so the execution of the warrant should be done in timely fashion so as to ensure so far as possible

3

Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435.439.441 (1925V M[T]he term fprobable
cause'...means less than evidence which would justify condemnatioa11
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the continued existence of probable cause."4
10. In the Affidavit dated June 7, 2000, obtained at 6:30 pm. by Officer Dale Stacey and
presented to Magistrate Ross McKinnon; the Affiant omitted the salient facts that the information
gained from informant Threll Orton was gained two months prior to the Affidavit and that the
information was given while Mr. Orton was in custody in Wyoming. In Harris, it was held that"...
that the informants observations may be too stale to support issuance of the warrant .5 If the
information obtained in April 2000 was deemed reliable, why was no search warrant sought by
Officer Stacey at that time? How can passage of time enhance the value and reliability of that
information?
11. If the Defendant makes a substantial showing that an Affidavit containing a false
statement which was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to thefindingof probable cause, The warrant may be
suppressed oi? thart basis alone."6
12. Referring to #10 of the Affidavit, PROBABLE CAUSE, Officer Stacey states, "Threll
Orton informed your affiant that he had bought MethamphetaminefromLaura Dable at the trailer
described in this affidavit on at least two occasions", referring to the report of Officer Stacey dated
6/14/00 we find the statement;" Back in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in
Evanston, Wyoming, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. — Officer Weston and I spoke

4

Sgro v. United States, 287118.206(1932).

'United States v. Harris 403 U.S. 573 (1973)
6

U.S. Supreme Court, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154(1978)
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to Orton while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the Methamphetamine he sold
from a woman in Randolph named Laura." It should be noted here that Orton apparently only said,
"a woman in Randolph named Laura", not 'Laura Dable', as Officer Stacey writes in the affidavit.
How then was there a credible belief that this woman was indeed Laura Dable, how many women in
Randolph are named Laura? How does Officer Stacey, in light of the April report justify this
statement that Defendant had sold Marijuana twice?
13. Officer Stacey in his report, writes that informant Orton told the Affiant he bought his
Methamphetamine from, "the person living in the described trailer." we refer to the 6/14/00
Deputy report stating that Orton, "described where she lived; referring to "a woman in Randolph
named Laura." The Affidavit, based on that record, would have no value to a neutral and detached
Magistrate and such information as is provided is totally conclusory in nature. Certainly the facts
recited in the Affidavit would lead no one to conclude that Laura Dable's actual residence is one and
the same as the one described by the informant. A Magistrate cannot rely only on a conclusion
arrived at by the officer, he must rely on facts and arrive at his own conclusions if he is to make
sound judgement and give force to the Fourth Amendment.
14. It is contended that the information given to Officer Stacey by the informant and that
given by Officer Stacey in the Affidavit presented to the Magistrate vary remarkably onefromthe
other and one can only conclude that the omissions were made with reckless disregard for their truth
and import and, on an objective basis, amounted to "bad faith."7
15. It is not so onorous a requirement that Officer Stacey himself was the one who
interviewed Threll Orton in April 2000, and on that basis he should have been sufficiently familiar
7

U. S. Supreme Court, Franks v. Delaware, (Supra)
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with the information to recite it fully and correctly in the affidavit to the Magistrate, and Officer
Stacey should have, of necessity, relied on the substance of his notes of this interview in his
affidavit.
POINT II:
Indicia of the reliability of the Informant Threll Orton as presented by the Affiant are
insufficient to allow the magistrate to credit any part of the information provided.
16. Referring to # 9 of the Affidavit, RELIABILITY, Officer Stacey lists that the reliability
of his informant, that being Threll Van Orton is, "statements against his penal interest", this is totally
conclusory and he makes no mention that the informant was under arrest and was incarcerated at the
time of that statement, nor was the magistrate informed that the statement was received 2 months
prior to the Affidavit, which information might well have caused the Magistrate to conclude that
there was scant reason to believe that the alleged illegal activity of 2 months prior was still going
on.
17. Is there any reason given why this infomant should be clothed with credibility or
truthfulness? Had the informant ever been an informant before? Had Officer Stacey ever met or
known of the informant before April 2000? Why no mention that the informant was charged with
serious crimes whichfeetitself might affect the Magistrates determination? It has been said that
"... there was no substantial basis for believing that the tip was truthful. Indeed, it [must be]
emphasized that the Affiant had never alleged that the informant was truthful, but only "prudent," a
word thai' s/fcoifies that he is circumspect in the conduct of his affairs, but reveals nothing about his
credibility." Unites States v. Harris 412F.2d (1969)8
*Cf United States v. Harris.403 U.S. 573(197n
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18. There is no evidence to show that since April 2000 there has been further contact with
informant Orton, inferring a thread of credibility. There is not enough information here as to the
credibility of this informant for the magistrate to make a judgement as to reliability of Threll Van
Orton.fln the case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan made it
plain that where police rely on an informant to justify a search and seizure, they must know that the
informant is generally trustworthy and that he has obtained his information in a reliable
way. As put by that worthy Justice: "I would only insist that this judgement be that of the
magistrate, not the law enforcement officer who seeks the warrant...., the agent surely could describe
for the magistrate such things as the informer's general background, employment, personal attributes
that enable him to observe and relate accurately, position in the community, reputation with others,
personal connection with the suspect, any circumstances which suggest the probable absence of any
motivation to falsify, the apparent motivation for supplying the information, the presence or absence
of a criminal record or association with known criminals, and the like. "Spinelli, Supra at p. 417y
19. The instant case fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be trustworthy, and
conversely supports only the conclusion that the affiant had no knowledge as to the informants
credibility and would therefore be hard pressed tofinda reason to credit truthfulness to informants
statements. This informant, as presented by the Affiant, provides no facts to support probable cause
for the search and seizure.
20. In Harris it was said that Nathanson held that "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he canfindprobable cause
therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of
belief or suspicion is not enough. "Nathanson at p. 47.) It has been argued that Nathanson should
Page 8 of 20
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be limited to holding that reputation, standing alone, was insufficient. But this is the precise
problem here - only the Defendant's reputation has been seriously addressed in efforts to establish
the credibility of the informant, an element of probable cause entirely severablefromthe requirement
that the .. source be reliable."9
21. "This case presents the question of how our decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). apply where magistrates, in issuing
search warrants, are faced with the task of assessing the probable credibility of unidentified
informants who purport to describe criminal activity of which they have personal knowledge, and
where it does not appear that such informants have previously supplied accurate information to
law enforcement officers."10
25- In this case, wefindthat the informant states he bought his drugsfrom,"a woman named
Laura in Randolph", but there is no amplifying or corroborating information to back up his claim,
which information would provide a substantial basis forfindingprobable cause, and neither does the
affidavit set forth the reliability of the informer in sufficient detail to indicate that the tip was based
on the informant's personal observation.^' Aguilar v. Texas held insufficient an affidavit which
merely asserted that the police had "reliable information from a credible person" that narcotics were
in a certain place and held that when the affiant relies on an informant's tip he must present two types
of evidence to the magistrate. First, the affidavit must indicate the informant's basis of knowledge the circumstancesfromwhich the informant concluded that evidence was present or that crimes had

United States v. Nathanson, 290 U.S. 41 (1933)
l0

United States v. Harris,(Supra)
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been committed- and, second, the affiant must present information which would permit the
magistrate to decide whether or not the informant was trustworthy."11/
23. In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,
it is particularly important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that
the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor
circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation.12
In Spinelli it was said that "The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959). provides a suitable benchmark.... A magistrate, when confronted with such detail,
could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." In the Draper
case the informant went into such minute detail, that there was no question but that the informant
was reliable and had gained his information in a reliable way. As to the information gainedfromthe
Informant Orton, there is no corroboration by way of a foliowup investigation after the time this
information was received in April 2000 by Officer Stacey to allow the Magistrate to determine that
the information was obtained in a reliable way and that the informer was generally trustworthy.
Rather, the Orton statement needed further support, as the information was several months old, and
were not fresh facts, so as toripeninto a judgement that a crime was probably being committed.
24(JSpinelli teaches that a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis
for a magistrate'sfindingof probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional
weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient." In this same case, the Court applied
"See also Jones v. United States362 U.S. 257 (1960VThis series of cases metamorphises
into the "Two prong test" of Aguilar & Spinelli.
,2

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410(1969)
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Aguilar in a situation in which the affidavit contained both an informant's tip and police information
of a corroborating nature. The Court rejected the 'totality" test derivedfromJones [v. United
States] and held that the informant's tip and the corroborating evidence must be separately
considered.YThe tip in this case should be rejected because the affidavit contained neither any
information which showed the current validity of the tip nor any information which showed the
informant's credibility. The affidavit here does not sufficiently set forthfeictsand circumstances from
which the magistrate might properly have concluded that the informant, in purporting to detail his
personal observation, was probably telling the truth.
25. The Harris court went on to say that... "The central point of the discussion of probable
cause in Aguilar is, as perhaps more precisely emphasized by our explicit twin holdings in Spinelli,.
at 416. that the two elements necessary to establish the informer's trustworthiness - namely,
that the tip relayed to the magistrate be both truthful and reliable - are analytically severable. It is not
possible to argue that the information might have been fabricated. This is why our cases require that
there be a reasonable basis for crediting the accuracy of the observation related in the tipy In short,
the requirement that the magistrate independently assess the probable credibility of the informant
does not vanish where the source of the tip indicates that, if true, it is trustworthy."
POINT HI:
There was, under the facts known to the Affiant no necessity for the Search
Warrant to be issued justifying a NIGHT SEARCH, nor did the search warrant specify
whether or not the Defendants privacy might be invaded to the extent of a Night time Search.
2t- Referring to # 6 of the Affidavit, Officer Staoey provided oo reason why the search must
be accomplished at night, the property receipt, inventory and return noting the time of the search as
22:35 on June 7,2000. Defendant contends, in that the return establishes a Night time Search with
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no reason given to justify the same. That there has been a clear violation of the Statute (UCA 77-23205) which violation standing alone, provides sufficient reason to suppress the resultant search.
Time clearly was not of the essence in this case, as the Defendant, whose property was to be
searched, had this same day been arrested and was presently incarcerated in Lincoln County,
Wyoming. As a practical matter Defendant could not have personally destroyed evidence that a
warrant might ultimately have discovered, and Defendant was, presumably, effectively isolated from
anyone connected with the alleged drug activity who might have gone in and destroyed evidence.
Those persons, in all probability, would not have even known that the Defendant had been arrested.
Extraordinary circumstances- such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence, clearly were not an
issue here and it is apparent that the official in executing a Night Time Search, exceeded his authority
under the warrant.13 The failure of the magistrate to limit the search warrant in and of itself nullifies
the search warrant.
27. Referring to # 7 of the Affidavit, NO KNOCK, the Affiant makes no attempt to justify a
No Knock warrant and nevertheless, the Magistrate does not restrict the warrant, again a clear
violation of the statute. In all cases, it must be remembered that a warrant is not personal to the
Affiant, it authorizes any official to execute the same. (UCA 77-23-201)
POINT IV:
The Affiant had no factual basis to support any contention of reliability of the
informants, Officers Kim Clark and Jody Gardner or to establish that their unnamed
informant was reliable.
28. Officer Stacey refers to other informants as Officers Kim ClarK and Jody Gardner, of the
Lincoln County Sheriffs Office, but he supplies no evidence that these persons are the arresting
,3

Miller v. United States 357 U.S. 309 See also Wong Sun v. United States371 U.S.
471(1963)
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officers holding Defendant in Wyoming. No facts are supplied with in the Affidavit or otherwise
which would allow a neutral and detached Magistrate to conclude that these informants are reliable
or that the informants had provided any credible information. Again, the Magistrate must be
provided with facts sufficient to conclude that a citizen might necessarily be deprived of
Constitutional protections. It is apparent from the Affiant that Wyoming authorities had relied on an
informant; yet those authorities had provided the Affiant with no indicia of reliability.
29. Under # 10 PROBABLE CAUSE in the Affidavit, Officer Stacey tells of a conversation
with the two officers used as informants, Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner, but provides no
facts as to the credibility of their anonymous informant and omits the important feet that Laura Dable
indeed had been arrested, facts that might direct an informedfindingthat drugs or drug
paraphernalia would be located at Defendant's residence.
30. In Spinelli (Supra) the Court imposed an important limitation when it said that, "[this]
Court's cases have already rejected for Fourth Amendment purposes the notion that the past
reliability of an officer is sufficient reason for believing his current assertions.tf
POINT V:
The list of property as authorized to be seized by the search warrant is vague, nonspecific.
31. The warrant does not purport to particularly describe the things to be seized but, instead
seems to leave it entirely to the discretion of the officials conducting the search to decide what
items to seize. It is said that, "The Fourth Amendment does not countenance open-ended warrants
to be completed while a search is being conducted and items seized or after the seizure has been
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carried out."14
32. The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches unlawful, the question becomes; what was the Peace OflScer serving the warrant
directed to seize, was that issue left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant?15 The
question becomes; what is the officer to look for and where is he to look? The warrant is of no
assistance in answering this threshold question.
33. The Courts have ruled previously that a warrant issued to permit a seizure of "mere
evidence" is not justifiable for a warrant," historically, the right to search for and seize property
depended upon the assertion by the Government of a valid claim of superior interest, and that it
was not enough that the purpose of the search and seizure was to obtain evidence to use in
apprehending and convicting criminals."16
34. "As the Court said in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,595 (1948). "a search is not
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change
character from " what is dug up subsequently. (Emphasis added)."17
POINT VI:
Regardless of the infirmities noted above, there is no factual basis recited within the
Affidavit upon which the Magistrate might make a finding of'probable cause9 for issuance of

,4

LO-JI SALES,INC. V. NEW YORK, 442 U.S. 319(1972)p. 325,326.

p e r r o n v/. United States * " US. 192,196 (\9H),
4i

See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.303 (1967). See Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298. 309 (1921). The holding was derivedfromdicta in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616.624-29(1886)
,7

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
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i
a warrant.
35. "History teaches us that this protection requires that the judgement of a judicial officer be
I
interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen; that the
judicial officer must judge and not merely rubber-stamp; and that his judgment must be based
upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the probability
that it will yield the fruits or instruments of crime...""... the fundamental role of the magistrate's
judgement in the preservation of a proper balance between individualfreedomand state power."
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, (1948) at page 700.
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, decided in 1961, held for thefirsttime that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was
applicable to the States cf Wolf v. Colorado (1948). That Amendment provides that search
warrants shall not be issued without probable cause. The existence of probable cause is a question of
feet that calls for a considered and correct determination.18
37. Emphasis upon the necessity of warrants interposes the judgement of an independent
magistrate between the exuberance of law enforcement officers and the privacy of citizens and
authorizes invasion of the privacy only upon a showing that constitutes probable cause." 19
38. "The point of the Fourth Amendment" is "it's protection - in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer

18

Sprnelti * United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)

19

While the exceptions may be different as between arrest warrants and search warrants,
the requirements for the issuance of the two are the same. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,112
IL3(1964. Also, the standards by which the validity of warrants are to be judged are the same,
whether federal or state officers are involved. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only at the discretion of police officers."20
39. For a magistrate to be able to determine probable cause for issuing a search warrant,
there are "two test of the validity of the power of the issuing party to so act." "He must be neutral
and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested
arrest or search."21"Good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the officer which in the judgement of the court would make
his faith reasonable."(U-S. v. Ross 456 U. S. 798(1982)page 2164. To determine "probable cause"
"An applicant for a warrant must present to the magistrate facts sufficient to enable that judicial
officer himself to make a determination of probable cause. "In determining what is probable cause...
[w]e are concerned only with the question whether the Affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of
his affidavit... for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if the
apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be
led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charge, there is probable cause justifying
the issuance of a warrant."22

20

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,13-14(1979).

2,

Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972)

^Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435,439,441 (1925V "[T]he term 'probable cause'
... means less than evidence which would justify condemnation." Lock v. United States, 11 U.S.
(7 Cr. 339,348 (1813). See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,504-05 (1925V It may rest upon
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40. It has been emphasized that the issuing magistrate "must judge for himself the
persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a [complainant] to show probable cause"; 23likewise, "An
insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony after issuance concerning information
possessed by the Affiant but not disclosed to the magistrate."24 and "... Mere conclusory assertions
are not enough."25
41. In the present case, we find the officer asserting his belief that there may be illegal drugs
and drug paraphernalia at the residence of Defendant, but the Affiant provides
no credible information establishing that the searched location is occupied by Defendant or that any
contraband might presently be located there.
42. We refer here to the Affidavit for case # 00-0381 of Rich County in the State of Utah,
given by Affiant Dale M. Stacey, referring to # 5 on page 2, there were no amplifying documents,
supplying the magistrate with any record of any conversation of an interview with informant Threll
i

Orton by Officer Stacey, and secondly, referring to # 5 on page 2, we find no amplifying documents
supplying the magistrate with record of any conversation between officers Clark and Gardner of
Lincoln County Wyoming and Affiant. The point of the Fourth Amendment is, it's protection - in

evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307311 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160. 173(1949). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102. 108-09(1965).

^Giordenillo v. United States, 375 U.S. 480,486 (1958).
24

Whftetey v. Wtmten, 401 U.S. 560 0971;.

25

Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (complainant merely stated his
conclusion that defendant had committed a crime). See also Nathanson v. United States, 209 U.S.
4L(1933).
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requiring the inferences that must be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer.
43. As was said in Aguilar, "It is, of course, of no consequence that the agents might have
had additional information which could have been given to the Commissioner. It is elementary that in
passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to
the magistrate's attention."
44. The Affiant states in the Affidavit that "Dable informed the officers that she had bought
the drugs in Ogden on 6-6-00 and had stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours
before going on up to Lincoln County. Here, there are no facts provided to the magistrate that
her residence referred to is a trailer, on Park Street, no description is given, and as we refer to
the Report, of 6/14/00, "On June 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable. —
We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening." The further question arises, what officer did
Defendant inform?
45. Further under probable cause, Affiant states, "Your Affiant feels there is probable
cause to believe some of the drugs bought in Ogden were left in the trailer, because there have
allegedly been sales madefromthe trailer to people in this county." here again we have a naked
conclusion, there are no facts provided to the magistrate which would form a basis upon which the
Affiant might conclude, as he did, that sales were made or that they were made to residents of
Randolph, Utah.
46. We refzv to the Psputy report dated 6/M/ 05 , where information reported, but not
supplied to the magistrate, Officer Stacey writes, "They [Lincoln County officers] had also found
some pay sheets on her that listed some clients in Randolph, specifically John and Eddie Cooper."
Page 18 of 20
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I
Referring to papers supplied to Defendants attorney, and provided herewith, there is nothing noted
other than numerals and names, no amounts or kinds of drugs which would qualify the notes as
"pay sheets" for drugs as Officer Stacey contends.
47. The Court in Harris after reviewing the earlier cases26 held that, "Thefinalcomponent of
the probable cause equation,... is that it must appear reasonably likely that the informer's claim that
criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring is probably accurate. The cases establish that this
element is satisfied only if there is reason to believe both that the informer is a truthful person
generally and that he has based his particular conclusions in the matter at hand on reliable data,
for it is not reasonable to enter another's premises on the basis of information, even if it appears quite
damning when simply taken at face value, unless there corroboration of its trustworthiness. The fact
that the magistrate has determined that the agent probably truthfully reported what the informant
conveyed cannot, of course, establish the credibility or reliability of the informant himself. More
immediately relevant here, the cases have established that where the Affiant relies upon the assertions
of confidential informants to establish probable cause, the affidavit must set forth facts which enable
the magistrate to judge for himself both the probable credibility of the informant and the reliability of
his information, for only if this condition is met can a reviewing court be satisfied that the magistrate
has fulfilled his constitutional duty to render an independent determination that probable cause
exists".
CONCLUSION
Thus, vchfte stnct rules ofevidence certainly do not govern magistrates' assessments of
26

Aguilar; Spinelli ;Giordinello; Nathanson; Whitely;
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probable cause, it would require a rather extensive relaxation of current requirements to permit
reliance on what was provided to the Magistrate in this case and that coupled with the irregularities
as to the form of the warrant and the affidavit; and in light of several noncompliances with statute;
and in light of the unsupported conclusions of the Affiant the search warrant executed in connection
with this case here should be suppressed.

Respect&jL
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Page 2
THE COURT:
21 Laura Dable.

Take the case of State of Utah versus

This is the time set for argument on

I plaintiff's motion to —
4| suppress51

excuse me.

Defendant's motion to

Mr. Lauritzen,
MR. LAURITZEN:

61 briefs in this matter.

Yes, Your Honor.

I have submitted

I think that this is a case that

7 1 probably stands out of my repertoire of practice before the
8 1 many courts in this land as an area where people simply just
9 J don't take the Fourth Amendment seriously.
10

I sometimes

wonder if the justice of the peace system, in their

111 instructions, don't tell the judges to go ahead and deal with
12 1 these things and expect that a higher court will take care of
13
14

it.
This is kind of shocking case in a way because there is

151 simply no basis on which one could credit the information
16

that was supplied to the justice with any aura of

17 1 credibility.

Certainly the officer had some information two

18 1 months before from an individual who he didn't know from a
191 bale of hay, so to speak.

He didn't do anything to

20

investigate that information, to verify anything that was

21

given to him there.

22

investigation as far as is shown on the affidavits.

23 1

In fact, he didn't really open an

Thereafter, two months later, he was apprised of

241 something that involved my client and on that basis he dug
25

out this old information and provided it to the justice,
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1

still not knowing anything about the credibility of the

2

individual who supplied the evidence or having given any

3

subsequent investigation to see if there was any basis for it

4

from his own knowledge.

The justice apparently looked at the

5 matter rather uncritically and signed the warrant.

I just

6

canft see how, under the circumstances, that this is an area

7

which we can allow to go on.

8
9

Then, the warrant itself is a blank.

Some of the areas

were filled in and some of the areas'were not.

It seems to

10 me that that's a serious default in itself because it leaves
11 areas open for someone to modify.

It isn't like the peace

12 1 officer who comes in and raises his right hand is necessarily
131 the one who serves the warrant.
14 officer.

The want is to any peace

Who knows whose hands those might pass through?

So

15 the warrant itself seems to me to be very suspect.
16

I suggest that under the circumstances there was

17 1 certainly no need for a hurry.

In fact, the defendant was

18 under arrest in another jurisdiction.
19 available for a warrant.

The telephones were

There was plenty of time to

20 transcribe all of these matters into the original without use
21 of a printed formed so that the directions were clear and not
22 subject to abridgement or change.
23

Again, I'm not going to belabor it, but I've gone into

24 several areas.

One of the things that I'm concerned about is

25 when the justice looked at the warrant he should have
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1

probably noted that the individual had not been Mirandised.

2

That may very well have caused him to question it if that had

3

been —

4

was —

51

if that information had been given him, that there
had been no Miranda.

But more seriously, probably more seriously than any of

61 the things we see here in this particular warrant, is the
7 1 fact that there were some omissions of some very serious
8

matters which could very well have colored the thinking of

9

the magistrate.

If he had known that the information that

10

was supplied to the officers, and which was narrated to him

11

in the affidavit, was taken from a person who was being held

12

under arrest un-Mirandised and who had a good deal to gain,

13 possibly, by providing information in exchange for his
14
15

freedom.

None of this was noted on the affidavit.

It isn't like someone came up, a citizen came up and

16

volunteered and said I have some information as a concerned

17

citizen.

18

have no axe to grind.

19

duress, who is under arrest, I think that should certainly be

20

noted.

21

I'm completely —

and in this particular case I

When we have a person who is under

I think that was a serious omission.

All in all, I suggest that the warrant was of such a

22

nature and was issued based on an affidavit with some

23

deficiencies to the point that in fact the search itself was

24

invalid and was not justified by the strictures of the Fourth

25

Amendment and any evidence seized thereby should be
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ll suppressed,
THE COURT:

Mr. Greenlief,

MR. GREENLIEF:

I have not had the privilege of

reading Mr. Lauritzen's memo in response to plaintiff's
5 opposition of the defendant's motion to suppress.
61 that it was sent on the 16th day of May.
71 believe it was not.

It says

I have no reason to

I just -- it's not in my file.

I talked

81 to my secretary and she didn't know about it, hadn't heard of
9

it either, but I stand as the one at' fault because it's my

101 office and I don't think it's the secretary's fault.

I just

111 didn't get it in any event.
12

However, the main thing which Mr. Lauritzen speaks of

131 this morning, and also in his briefs and so forth, is that
14 the trouble with the information garnered from the defendant
15 in the Lincoln County prison —
16 Maybe it was Uintah County.
17 1 was Uintah County.
18

or Lincoln County jail.

No, I believe it was —

okay, it

It was down south of us here.

But the key to the entire thing is that the primary thing

19 that the officers were relying on is that there was
20 information from two very good —

well, two other officers in

21 Uintah County, Evanston, that the defendant had been stopped
22 and was at that time in jail in Uintah County in Evanston for
23 drug matters.

That's the way I understand the case and

24 that's the key to it.

These two officers knew what they had

25 found and that's pretty well set forth in the briefs and so
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1 forth.
2

So the information of Therell was not necessary.

It was

3

supportive, as was stated in our original response.

And that

4

is all that it actually was.

5

it happened first by a couple of months, but that was not the

It was put first simply because

61 actual thing.
7

It's my understanding that Mr. Orton was given his

8 J Miranda again by —
9

well, no.

He was not because he was not

given it because he wasn't charged. * They were just talking

10 to him about this particular lady.

He wasn't the focus of

11 any thought by the Rich County officers, so at that time it
12 wasn't necessary to give him the Miranda.

He was in jail,

13 but it wasn't because of anything Rich County had done.
14

I believe on those bases we'll submit it.

151

THE COURT:

Rebuttal?

16

MR. LAURITZEN:

17

THE COURT:

I'll submit it, Your Honor.

Well, one problem that you've got,

18 counsel, both of you is that nobody has given me a firm set
19 of facts in this case.

Now, Mr. Lauritzen, you've alleged

20 certain facts in your original memorandum in support of the
21 petition to suppress.

Since nobody objected to that I can

22 only assume that those facts are true and accurate.
23

The facts that the court finds in this case are that in

24 April of 2000, Officer Stacey spoke with a man named Therell
25 Orton after he'd been arrested by Wyoming authorities and
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 7
1 while incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming.

And that Officer

2

Stacey got in — Mr. Orton informed Officer Stacey that he'd

3

gotten the methamphetamine, which provided the basis for the

4 Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a
5 description of the residence was provided.
6

Now, you've not disputed that, Mr. Greenlief.

Is that

7 1 then correct?
8

MR. GREENLIEF:

We've not disputed that he said

9 Laura.
10

THE COURT:

But he didn't say Laura Dable?

11

MR. GREENLIEF:

No, but there are no other Lauras in

12 Randolph, to my knowledge.
13

THE COURT:
I *

Well, how do we know that?

*

14 affidavit state that?
15 that

Did the

So the court finds that as a fact,

—

16

MR. GREENLIEF:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GREENLIEF:

I believe, Your Honor, if I may.

Try me out.
I believe he did give a description

19 of the trailer and of the outside of it and so forth.

An

20 eight on the front, the color, where it was on the south
21 end —

excuse me, the north end of the trailer court on Park

22 Street.
23

THE COURT:

I don't think there's any question, even

24 though that Mr. Lauritzen didn't put that in his statement of
25 facts, and which you didn't address in your memorandum, that
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1

the trailer was described with specificity, but I think --

2 1 let's look at the affidavit that was submitted in support of
3 1 the request for the search warrant.
4I

(Pause in the proceedings.)

51

THE COURT:

Yes.

It says Therell Orton told your

61 affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura
7 1 Dable.
8

Already, however, itfs agreed that that was Laura,

not Laura Dable, the person living in the described trailer.

91 There is a description of the trailer.

Dable was arrested in

101 Lincoln County, Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of
111 methamphetamine and some marijuana.

Mr. Lauritzen, there's

12 1 no dispute as to that?
13

MR. LAURITZEN:

14

THE COURT:

No.

All right.

The court further finds that

15 this Therell Orton did not say Laura Dable, he said, Laura,
16 but then went on with specificity and described a trailer,
17 1 which is the trailer which is the subject of the search.
18 That occurred in April of 2000.

Then, on June 6th, 2000,

19 Officer Stacey was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from Lincoln
20 1 County, Wyoming and Officer Clark told Officer Stacey that an
211 informant had told them the defendant was going to Ogden to
22 pick up some methamphetamine and marijuana to sell in Lincoln
23 1 County and apparently he was going to stop and search the
24 vehicle.
25

Mr. Lauritzen, you'll agree that those are facts?
MR. LAURITZEN:

They were in the affidavit.
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1
2

MR. GREENLIEF:

Also, I believe Jody Gardner was the

additional officer from Uintah County in Wyoming,

In Lincoln

3 County, rather,
4

THE COURT:

Kim Clark and an Officer Jody Gardner,

5 both officers in Lincoln County, Wyoming.

Then your next

6

facts, Mr. Lauritzen, indicate, and the court will so find,

7

that there was a telephone conversation between Officer

8

Stacey and Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jody Gardner from

9 Wyoming, wherein they indicated that' they had a confidential
10 informant who had indicated that the defendant was going to
11 pick up methamphetamine in Ogden.
12

All right.

Then we'll go to number four of the facts set forth by

13 Mr. Lauritzen.

Officer Stacey relied upon the above

14 information prepared in the affidavit, a copy of which-is
15 attached hereto as exhibit A.

Officer Stacey, without

16 assistance of Rich County, presented the affidavit with the
17 proposed search warrant.
18

Wait a minute.

Let's go back to number three of Mr.

19 Lauritzen's alleged facts.

It says it was reported to

20 Officer Stacey that the defendant admitted to Officer Kim
21 Clark and Officer Jody Gardner that she had bought the drugs
22 in Ogden and had stopped at her trailer in Randolph before
23 proceeding to Wyoming where she was arrested.
24

Mr. Lauritzen, what I would like you to do, Ifm going to

25 direct your attention to a couple of things here and ask you
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1

to give me your position on them.

2

MR. LAURITZEN:

31

THE COURT:

Okay.

That is, do you feel that the admission

4 1 made by your client on 6/7/00 to the Lincoln County officers
51 did not constitute sufficient probable cause to authorize the
61 issuance of a search warrant?
71

MR. LAURITZEN:

And if so why not?

Because, number one, she didn't say

8j that she picked up or left any drugs at the trailer.
9J

THE COURT:

10

But she did admit she was there?

MR. LAURITZEN:

That she stopped there.

The second

111 reason is because in fact she had told the officers that she
12 J had picked up the drugs in Ogden.

I mean, it isn't like she

131 told them she had picked them up at her trailer.

She could

14 1 have stopped there for any reason, but she was nonspecific in
15

that.

161

And third, the officers themselves are not automatically

17 1 entitled to credit for reliability.

The officers, assuming

18 1 they were officers, and I have no reason to believe they were
191 otherwise, still have got to be given some aura of
201 credibility.

They just can't state that, state something and

211 take it at face value.
22 J up.

There has to be something to back it

Probably the officers here in Rich County have in the

231 past dealt with these fellows.

I don't know.

They are

24 1 silent in that area and that concerns me.
251

It could have been green officers faced with their first
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1

arrest; faced with not enough evidence themselves to make an

2

arrest and wanting to get some more evidence.

3

had some reasons for their own to go ahead and try to supply

4

facts which would allow them to ultimately gain additional

5

evidence.

6

They may have

I don f t know that.

The other reason, of course, is that Ms. Dable herself

7

was under arrest at that time.

8

this court at this time that she had been Mirandised.

9
10
11

THE COURT:

There's no evidence before

Do you think that there's some case law

that says she has to be?
MR. LAURITZEN:

I can't find any, but I suggest that

12

that's certainly a factor that the justice should take into

13

consideration, whether or not the person had been warned,

14

number one, of their right to remain silent which would give

15

them ease in dealing with the police.

16

whole reason for the Miranda is to give them ease and not

17

feel threatened, realizing that they have certain rights.

18

And with that in mind they might be more likely, number one,

19

to speak truthfully or, number two, not to speak at all.

20

Anyway, those are the reasons I give the court.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think that's the

I'll direct your attention to

22

another deficiency in the search warrant and hear your

23

position on that.

24

to the court, the search warrant says you are therefore

25

commanded to make immediate search in the day time, any time

That is the, and this causes some concern
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II day or night, of the person of the vehicles described as, and
2 J then it goes on to say one small RV trailer, single axle, and
31 describes the premises.
41

Where it says in the day time, any time day or night, was

51 never marked, crossed off, et cetera.

Section 77-23-205 says

61 the magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that
71 it is to be served in the day time, unless the affidavit or
81 oral testimony states a reasonable cause to believe that a
91 search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior
10I to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for
111 other good reason, in which case he may insert a direction
121 that it be served any time of the day or night.

And the

13 officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the
14 I search.
15

This search, as I understand it, and again the facts as

161 alleged by Mr. Greenlief in his memorandum in opposition
171 thereto, indicates that this search began at 6:32 p.m.

Now,

181 at 6:32 p.m. on June 7th of the year 2001, is that day time
19 or night?
20

MR. LAURITZEN:

That was in the day time.

I'll

211 agree with that.
22

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything else, Mr.

231 Lauritzen, you'd like to bring to my attention?
24

MR. LAURITZEN:

251

THE COURT:

No.

I'm going to deny the motion to suppress
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1

and in so doing indicate the following.

2

findings here.

I've made certain

I'm going to find that the information

3 provided by the peace officers out of Lincoln County, Wyoming
4

was such that it did not require any more verification of a

5 J reliable witness other than being peace officers, because
6

they just relaid information that she'd picked up drugs in

7

Ogden and told them that she'd stopped in —

at her residence

8 1 or this trailer as described in Randolph, and then down to
9
10

Wyoming.
If the information had of required some sort of

11 subjective reasoning on behalf of the witness, that is the
12 1 person providing the information, then I think the police
13 officers should have gone into it further.

But the mere fact

14 that the police officers were conveying a confession and the
15

facts of that confession, and the fact that they were police

16 officers, and I don't have the case directly at hand, but
17 there is a case which indicates that under certain
18 circumstances the mere fact that it is a police officer
19 relaying the information, that police officer can be assumed
20

to be a reliable witness unless there's seme reason why it

21

should not be.

22

find that's the reason why additional information was not

23

required of those witnesses.

24

In this case he is just relaying that.

I

I find that the time frame, from the time that this Orton

25 provided the information being nearly two months, in this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 14
1

particular case is not determinative of striking a search

2

warrant.

3

issuance of a search warrant in and of itself.

Normally stale information is not a basis for the
However,

4I stale information may be used as background information only.
5 J And in this case that background information, even though it
61 took place a couple of months before, or at least the
7

information was provided a couple of months before, gave a

8

basis for this during the course of the history, sometime or

9

another, provided a place for this type of activity to take

10 place.
11

One thing I will note that bothers me, that is that the

12

affidavit does not link up Laura Dable with the name Laura

13

and the residence.

14

concerns of the document have to provide the information for

15

the magistrate to do that.

16

magistrate, magistrate, they said Laura.

17

and they described the residence and I know Laura Dable lives

18

at that residence.

19

acknowledge that.

20

circumstances, I still will not grant the motion to suppress.

21

There's another thing that should be included in this and

I think they can be assumed, but the four

Sheriff, you did not say to the
I know Laura Dable

That's missing in this and the court
Nevertheless, taking the totality of the

22

that is that the court finds that the -- from the facts

23

before it at this time, and whether it actually occurred or

24

not, but for the purposes of rendering this decision, Mr.

25

Lauritzen, I find that the defendant was not Mirandised bv
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1

the Lincoln County sheriff's office when she provided that

2

information.

3

indicates that,

At least there's nothing in the document which
Mr. Lauritzen has indicated that he's not

4 been able to find any case law which would require that she
5 be Mirandised.

That may be something that the appellate

6

court should look at to give a basis for that, for them to

7

take a look at it.

The court will find, though, for today's

8 purpose I cannot find that she was Mirandised, but I find
9

that that doesn't make a difference for the purpose of this

10 search warrant.
11

Now, also, the order should include that even though the

12 search warrant itself does not indicate —

it troubles me

13 that the search warrant itself does not indicate that it was
14 to be served day time, night time or at any time.

Because it

15 was served during the day time, the court does find that that
16 is not a basis to strike.
17 then the court —

If it was served in the evening,

the decision of the court here today may be

18 something different.

But where it was not served in the

19 evening, I find that that made no difference whatever to the
20 search warrant.
21

Now, who would like to prepare the order?

22

MR. LAURITZEN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GREENLIEF:

I will.

Mr. Lauritzen -I was going to suggest we kind of

25 work on it together.
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MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

That's fine.

You can do whatever.

make certain findings.

What I've done is

For example, the not Mirandising the

defendant, Mr. Lauritzen, you very well may want to put that
together in case you want to take that up on appeal.

I think

I've given you sufficient information for an appellate court
to review that.
8J

I think it's often been said that the appellate court is

91 last, but they are after me.

I have to make certain

10 J decisions and give them a basis for review.
11
12

point the court will deny the motion to suppress.
With that, do we need to set this matter for trial?

13

MR. LAURITZEN:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LAURITZEN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LAURITZEN:

18

THE COURT:

191
20
21

But at this

Yes, please.

Do you want a one day jury trial?
I think that should be sufficient?

Any need to expedite it, Mr. Lauritzen?
No.

Becky, what do we have about September?

(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Lauritzen, how does the 4th of

October appear?

22

MR. LAURITZEN:

23

THE COURT:

That's fine.

Ms. Dable, you have the right to a

24

speedy disposition in this matter.

25

some time.

This has been pending for

What we've just set here is it will pend until
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1

October.

Are you willing to waive your right for a speedy

2 1 disposition until that time?
3

THE DEFENDANT:

41

THE COURT:

Yes.

Very well.

All right.

Anything else to

51 address as relates to Ms. Dable?
MR. LAURITZEN:
THE COURT:

Not that I can think of.

Any other matters that need to come to

the court's attention today?
MR. LAURITZEN:

None that I know of.

MR. GREENLIEP:

No.

THE COURT:

Hearing none, we 1 11 be in recess.

(Hearing concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah,
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 17, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Rich
County, Randolph, Utah.
I also certify that I am not associated with any
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested
in the event thereof.
Witness my hand this 21st day of October, 2002.

^S^^±I^li3ddc^.
Rodney M.T/Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R,
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RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

I A I r IUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE.

vs
LAURA DABLE,

1 1.

L J'! ::: !

D e f e n da J i t

PRESENT
Clerk:
beckyp
Prosecu 1:or : GREENI.IEF, « J0E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney*
LAURITZEN
DE FEN DANT INFORMATION
Date of b i r t h : December 29, 1957
Audio
Tape I lumber :
!.. "i 30 J

B

CLINT S. JUDKINS
December 13, 2001

W

CHARGES
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
i i Degree
Felony
PI e a : G u i 11}
D i s p o s i t i o n : 1 0 / 0 4 / 2 0 01 { G u i 11 y P1 e a }
.LEGAL -OSS/USE O F CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class- B
Misdemeanor
I: 1 f : & m 'I J U
sposi Li i)i I ::
Guilty i
0 1 2
HEARING
TAPE: 121301 A Certificate -of probable cause was presented.
Sentence to be suspended until appeal perfected.
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Case No: 001100027
Date:
Dec 13, 2001
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
.SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for
this charge is 180 day(s).
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:
Charge # 2
Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$800.00
$0.00
$367.57
$800.00
$600.00
$0.00
$275.68
$600.00
$1400.00
$0
\
$643.25
\ vr/\ ^
$1400.00
7*f -H^
Plus Interest^
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation.
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Case I lor 001100027
. 3te:
Dec 1 3 , 2

PROBATION

CONDITIONS

Defendant will e n t ei I nt o ag r e eme nt w i t h P r obat i on and ab ide by a1J
terms and conditions.
Prison term is suspended upon successfuJ completion of probation.
C omp 1 e t e alcohol and o i d r u g c o u n s e 1 i n g
p a ) a J I f e e s =i i: : „ il f :i ] ^ *
notice of completion with the Court.
Consume o r p o s s e s s n o a 1 c o h o 1 ' d r u g s
f i e q u e n t n: i c p 1 a c e s a 1 c o h o 1
s e r v e d o r c o n s u m e d i n c 1 u d i n g t: a i: s, p a r t i e s, J i q i i c ' r s t:' : < i: e
Violate no laws.
S u b m i t t o r a n d o m s e a r c h a i I d s e i z u i: e .
K e e p C o u r t i n f o rme d o f c u r r e n t a dd r e s s w 1 i i ] * < : > i :i p r o b a t i D r i,
No association with known criminals.
Defendant, shall c omp 1 e t e R e 1 a p s e W o r kb o o k
Defendant r -..-;-*-- - "
am of two a > r .
;: . • : contacts per
week
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for case
001100027 by the method and on the date specified.

Method

Mail

Name

A. W. Lauritzen
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321

By Hand

Joe Greenlief

Dated this 14th day of January, 2002.
/

p^t^C^c^

f*-&**

Deputy Court Clerk
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ft

to

suppress?

i ,„ " ill | h i . , ]::: 1 ' • ' ,

a plea

1:: >j

II I: „ =• h a;;

-serving the issues

resented in the motion to suppress

20

THE COURT:

id we have a prelim in this ^adt rather

IJ than a waiver?
MR. IAURZTZEN:
COURT

23
-'" need t i.
25 I p

.-

think we waived the prelim.
can go back and look at the minutes if
*a-ver :o;io,

I
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lj

MR. LAURXTZEN:

She was before the court, I'm sure,

2 J because we set the matter for trial.
31
41

(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT:

Ms. Dable, youTve had an ample

5 I opportunity to discuss this matter with your attorney?
61

THE DEFENDANT:

7J

THE COURT:

Yes.

He has explained all of this to your

8 1 satisfaction so you feel that you understand what is going on
91 right now?
101

THE DEFENDANT:

11J

THE COURT:

Sort of.

I mean

—

Do you want additional time to talk with

12 1 Mr. Lauritzen?
131

THE DEFENDANT:

141

THE COURT:

No.

I understand what he's said.

Did you consume any alcohol or drugs

15 before you came in here today?
161

THE DEFENDANT:

I71

THE COURT:

No.

Do you feel that you're thinking

18 J clearly, able to make a reasoned decision right now?
19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

1

Yes.

Now, you understand that a third degree

211 felony carries with it a possible prison sentence of up to
22 1 five years and a fine of up to $5,000.

A Class B misdemeanor

23 1 carries with it a possible jail sentence of six months and a
24 1 fine of a thousand dollars.

Those fines could have an 85

25 1 percent surcharge assessed as well.

Do you understand that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

?a De 4
1

thai could b e the . *. :iu

2

THE DEFENDANT: fes

3

THE COURT:

You understand that this penalty could

b e i n a d el i t: 1 i) i „ t o e a c :: \ , ^ ' t , I: * , 3

T! , , I i

i ^ e a c I: i c f t: J:i e

5

you could b e sentenced on what we call consecutive sentences.

6

L .

; a*- : .;: a

•

7

THE DEFENDANT -

8

THE COORT

9

' o u i 11 ,

QVau,
^

to these chai^^.- •

l

-.

that b y | lend nc

v C .He bidte u

proving your guilt

10

beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial o f this matter.

11

understand that if w e had a trial it would b e a jur\

n

ai I ::::! " ' ::: " 1! ::i 1: • 2 s ::•
: t: a s s :: :: -n a s j: : '. ssi I:: J :::: ' s ::: i t i ;oi i ,i ! ::i t 3 a sp
We had that tz :i ::: I s e t f o r t: : : :1c ,"" r , b u t if you were to

1 3 j t::i::i a J

change your mind we would reset it as s< >n as possible.
At
1 5

. _;

oL,aue imu pxa

element of the offenses alleged beyond

17
1 ^1
1
:
J

9

2 :

21
22

^,,,
= ^ - : '" -

Mr. Lauritzen

,, , i ,
„ attorney could

' • • "" i. i ' "• • ' t J: , ., ' ' ' r. i I ,„ ; „• , , , ^ ,

"•ess---*-

- • Jl I I , „ „ ; ^ £ ,

,,, ' „ i

You would have the right to

subpoena them to ensure that they would b e at the trial.
" 111 I »••" s t j f v b u t t > 11 I \f

23

you.

2!

*

25

- rstify.

L :/: r i

| v' i ' M w a n t c d I

Il I 11 111 te

IiI

Yoii
Il i

rhat would b e voluntary on your p a r t .
t r : a •

«<• ^

a | p • I| I I ,F f t * r : i mi i

- ,\ .

.

:

> ~

.

~a'

You ui iderstand t h a t you have a l l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of

io/uo

i * ; o o roA *oo m

*PJ_U

i l l

UIOl

V/L-HKIVJIIAM V . 1 1 I

Page 5
1 these rights?
2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

You understand that if you plead guilty

4 here today you give up or waive these rights?
5

MR. LAURITZEN:

Your Honor, at this point we need to

6 make it clear that this is a plea not without conditions.
7

THE COURT:

Why don't you set that forth for the

8 record, counsel.
9

MR. LAURITZEN:

This plea is entered on the express

10 condition that she reserves the right to have the superior
11 courts of the state of Utah review her motion to suppress and
12 the evidence in connection therewith.
13 is —

And this reservation

in other words, she's not, even though she realizes

14 that some of her rights are extinguished by her plea, her
15 right to appeal is not and she gets the full right to appeal
16 all of the issues raised in the motion to suppress before
17 this court.
18

THE COURT:

You understand, though, that this appeal

19 that Mr. Lauritzen is talking about is the only right you
20 would have to appeal from the decision this court made on the
21 motion to suppress?

You understand that there wouldn't be

22 introduced any evidence in a trial, therefore you could not
23 appeal any trial court's decision to an appellate court, you
24 understand that?
25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
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1

MR. IAURITZEN:

You're waiving your right to a

2 J trial.

You might present information, for instance, that no

3 I matter what stuff was in your house it belonged to a third
4 I person.

You would be precluded from that, which I don't

51 suppose is one of the defenses we contemplated, but I've
6 1 giving that as an example.
7I

The only thing we're talking about is the invalidity of

B J the warrant and the affidavit in support of the warrant that
9 I was presented to the judge who issued the warrant and their
10 1 effect upon the ultimate search of your premises, do you
11J understand that?
12 1

THE DEFENDANT:

13 1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Very well.

Now, has anyone promised you

14 J anything or threatened you with anything to get you to plead
15 1 guilty to these two counts, other than as represented to the
161 court by Mr. Lauritzen a few minutes ago that it be reduced
17 J to a third degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor and you
18 1 would reserve the right to appeal the court's decision on the
191 motion to suppress?

Anything else?

Mr. Lauritzen, you're

20 J standing.
211

MR. LAURITZEN:

The only other thing is the state

22 J has agreed not to oppose a motion for certificate for
23 I probable cause if one is filed in this case.
24 J

THE COURT:

Anything else?

25

MR. IAURITZEN:

Not that I know of.
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11

THE COURT:

Very well.

The charge, Ms. Dable, count

2 J one, now reads possession or use of a controlled substance in
3 I a drug free zone in violation of Utah Code Annotated section
41 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i), a third degree felony, as follows.

That on

5 J or about June 7th of last year, in Rich County, the defendant
6 1 did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled
7 1 substance, to whit methamphetamine, a class two substance.
8J

Count two now reads possession or use of a controlled

9 J substance in a drug free zone in violation of Utah Code
10 Annotated section 58-37-B (2) (e), a Class B misdemeanor, as
111 follows.

That on or about June 7th, 2000, in Rich County,

12 J the defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use
13 1 less than one ounce of marijuana, a schedule one controlled
14 substance, and committed the offense.
15 1

To those two counts, how do you plead?

16 1

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

1

Guilty

Mr. Greenlief, give us the factual basis

18 1 for the two counts, please.
19

201 meth.

MR. GREENLIEF:

This material was in her home, the

And subsequent to a —

it was found by a search

21 warrant signed by a local justice of the peace, as I recall.
22 And the county sheriff on June 7th, 2000, went in and looked
23 1 through the home and found the meth and also the marijuana on
24 1 the 7th of June here in Rich County.
25 1

THE COURT:

Ms. Dable, you heard the facts
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1 represented to us by Mr. Greenlief.

Are you pleading guilty

2 because you committed the offense as he's described it?
3

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

4

THE COURT:

The court will receive the guilty pleas,

5 finding the same to be made freely and voluntarily.

This

6 appears to be a case where a presentence report would be
7 helpful to the court.

Counsel, what have you done about

B coordinating sentencing with your appeal?
9

MR. LADRITZEN:

I suggest she needs to be sentenced

10 before the appeal.
11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LADRITZEN:

13 report.

The results of that may very well affect her

Do you want to proceed with that today?
I suggest we get the presentence

14 ultimate decision whether to appeal or not.
15

THE COURT:

Very well.

Becky, when do we have

16 something in about six weeks?
17

(Pause in the proceedings.)

IB

THE COURT:

19

MR. LAURITZEN:

20

THE COURT:

How does the 13th appear, counsel?
Fine.

That's a little more than 45 days. Ms.

21 Dable, you have the right to be sentenced in not less than
22 two nor more than 45 days.

Will you waive that time frame so

23 we can proceed with the presentence report?
24

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Very well.

I need to advise you that
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1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2I
3J

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was

4 1 transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
51

Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for

61

the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah.

7I

That a full, true and correct transcription of the

8 J hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
91 pages numbered 2 to 9, inclusive.
10 1
11

I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Rich

12 J County, Randolph, Utah.
13 1

I also certify that I am not associated with any

14 I of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested
15 1 in the event thereof.
161

Witness my hand this 23rd day of October, 2002.

17

19 |

Rodney M. LFelshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R.

20
21
22
23
24
25
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ll even though this has been set clear into December, it will
2 1 take AP&P nearly that long to prepare the report.

You need

3 I to set iup an appointment with them and keep those
4 1 appointments.

It has been my policy that if they don't have

5 J that report prepared because you were tardy in reporting to
I
I

i
1

6| them or keeping appointments, then you will have to go to
7 I jail until they complete that process.
8I

I Also need to further advise you that if you want to

9 I change your mind and withdraw the plea made here today, you
10 J would ijiave to file that motion within the next 30 days for
i

111 the court to even consider it,
121

MR. LAURITZEN:

Your Honor, there is an officer from

13 I Adult Probation and Parole here today.

I'll have her talk to

14 J her briefly.
151

THE COURT:

Very well.

If you'll meet with this

161 young lady over here she'll help you out.
17 J

Very well.

(Hearing concluded.)

IB
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

L
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APPENDIX F
APPLICATION FOR
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
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A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321

>

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintuT,

APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE

vs.
LAURA DABLE
Defendant,

Case No. 00110027 FS
Judge Judkins

COMES NOW THE Defendant with this her application for a certificate of probable cause
and alleges
1. Defendant pleaded guilty conditionally to the charges on which she is to be sentenced
on 13 December, 2001
2. Defendant conditioned her plea reserving the question of
A. The validity of the Search Warrant
B. The adequacy of the underlying affidavits
C. The question of whether the Search Warrant was issued on probable cause
D. Certain other irregularities and inadequacies raised by pleadings filed in this
case
3. Defendant certifies that probable cause exists for appeal and that the issues
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I

have merit and are arguable and have not been heretofore addressed by the Appellate Courts in
this jurisdiction and case law exists that is supportive of Defendants position
Defendant suggests that a certificate of probable cause is warranted in this case

Dated this

day of December, 2001

A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney at Law

AWL/em
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APPENDIX G
AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
RICH COUNTY
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Case No.

fiO~QZFt

.

Defendant(s)
AFFIDAVIT
RICH COUNTY

)
)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss

Affiant, being first duly sworn, states on oath that:
1.
OFFICER
employed for
7/?

I am a peace officer in the State of Utah
years by tfkk (?u~4y Slw.ffs
Off,c*.

2. PROPERTY. The property or evidence for which a search
warrant is sought is described as follows: T1l«jal Co«fal\-<i.l j«6sf*.Hc^

3. LOCATION. I have probable cause to believe this,property
or evidence is located on the
person v^ vehicle v premise
(check those that apply) described as: (the description must be so
specific that the location could be found by one not knowing where
it is) . /J ^/,,'fc -fr^'itr i^iiis 8k* Tfiln /*»«»/«/ j'uif &$-(- of <?$ iJtsf
fa.il S{«-e\ »V» RthjAfh. %ete if A </ir/Jfc Y o« fhe &"+ o*f ikt ira/fer
W a Tip oui o* iki. ^rfU &st rti*. %t -h-^kris rk„w.'«j AJ«& W
SOJIK «KJ /S fr.™*jd<J by <K fact. ~7h? 4/«x is cc^i^J-d u^iu yt*s1*e(

Mis <*J ^

S^K

vn«b «inV-. ifon

5«Wn W t A ^

^

// A Bk< M

~M* *

^ S ^ l ^ s ^

4*»*r

*******

K ^ £ w <y - ^
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
\

RICH COUNTY
THE STATE OF UTAH,

SEARCH WARRANT

Plaintiff.
vs .
/*ur«.

\

case NO. nfl-osrl
flablt

Defendant ( s ) .

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF RICH,
STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by affidavit was made before me this day by
that there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, (in the
daytime)(anytime, day or night) of the person of

of the vehicles described as: / S*ml\ #(/ jratUr, £*'•*/* **l<. UJ^U h*i (w<J <*-

of the premises described as: \fjl*M lf^Mrj^!t\r\
4r«A*f *J

a

^0

•*+ °^ +^* A/*fV» &s+ sAt*. fa -failic

for the following property: - C^-fo/lW SuhSmric^

glue 7nVv,; Uc«\eJ JU5f £<j
is r«"w,'»y ^ f c W r ^

pacKaaivLQ i>hciiena(t qf a^u ji

If you find any of the property described above, or any
part thereof, bring it before me immediately at his court and
make return within 10 days, as required by Utah Code Ann.
Section 77-23-1 et seq.
You (are)(are not) authorized to execute this search warrant
without giving prior notice of your authority and purpose.
DATE SIGNED:

TUWJY>

" 7 - &Q

<*-^l i

TIME SIGNED:

JUDGE
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Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 2
4.
STATUTORY GROUNDS.
I have probable cause to believe this
property or evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with
name of crime).
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being
L
used to commit or conceal the commission of the offense of SSfai dltif

5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in
this affidavit as though set forth herein:
(list written
informants1 statements, documentary evidence and other exhibits)
Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night as follows:
(state why property may be
concealed, damaged, altered or other good reason).

7.
NO KNOCK.
I have
search to be conducted
(state why the object
disposed of or secreted
if notice is given).

the following evidence which allows the
without notice of authority and purpose:
of the search may be quickly destroyed,
or why physical harm my result to a person
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 3

8.
ANONYMOUS INFORMANTS.
anonymous informants:

The following are designations of

Their identity is withheld because (state why the informant would
be endangered or his usefulness destroyed if name was* stated)

t
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 4
9.
RELIABILITY.
I believe the informants named herein to be
reliable for these reasons: (check those that apply)

z

_the following informants made statements against
their penal interest: ffofl| yor1 Offa\
_the following informants are citizen informers who have no
interest in this matter: (also state which ones are known to you
personally)

/ the following informants are peace officers with the
departments noted: tivttofa (c<x^k sAwfij m^4 -. ({in* C/mL < W TZL <Ww«C

JL .the f o l l o w i n g informants are r e l i a b l e because ( s t a t e the
name of each informant an£ f a c t s corroborating h i s statement or
p r e v i o u s r e l i a b l e statements) "ffotii Ork>^ Uo Unr «f&»^ "jtaf A* «*»J c\Uf^
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 5
10. PROBABLE CAUSE. The following facts establish that probable
cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant:
(state the
specific facts of the case, state how they were observed, state the
date they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant)

0C(a<>iov\S,

-/k< U*<*U &rvk $l*r$-(l Office. Kvea i*ik«ld
A jltoj

(«it

! **uJ

f/><*( A

SonfclrMtat

^Vtcdn & A /o se/L dvy 4-7-oo)
(\a\M i*p»*W -/k ff-Pficm m

/*krwtant

(bbk

«J«S

she U

f<rU

/ ^ f ~*ty u/€f^ ***£'*) o»\
ffo«*, ^ „ f

£aur<i

0<*lfk "XtS

styf*J **J kir vrtok S**ti«J. 1k<

b°*ft\ -fa «*jf * ^ ^
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AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 6.
DATE SIGNED: fjl+vJL 7,

,feo

TIME SIGNED:

iXiO

Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this / day of \\U,*JJC^~

<^A

m*k:^

Judge
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APPENDIX H
RICH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
DEPUTY REPORT
6/14/00
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11/22/00
•*T5T39

—

Rich Co. Sheriffs Office
Deputy Report

1.

Incident:

Search Warrant.

2.

Location:

Randolph, UT 84064

Page:

3. Other Information: On June 7, 2000, at around 3:00 P.M., I spoke
with Deputy Kim Clark from the Lincoln County Wyoming Sheriff's Office.
He had also spoken to me the day before about a woman named Laura Dable.
Dable has a trailer on West Park Street in Randolph.
On June 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable.
He said that they had an informant that told them Dable was going to
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln
County. He felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop
and search the vehicle. We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening.
On.June 7, Officer Clark called to let me know that they had arrested
Dable. At the time of the arrest, she had approximately 4 ounces of
Marijuana and 8 grams of Me thamphet amine. They had also found some pay
sheets on her that listed sgmg rl-jfint-g in Randolph. Specifically John
and Eddie Cooper. Dable told Officer Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner that
she had bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in
Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming.
Back in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in Evanston,
Wyoming, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. After the arrest
was made by the Wyoming Officers, Officer Wayne Weston and I did a
consent search on Orton's house. We found some paraphernalia and
approximately 14 ounces of Marijuana. Officer Weston and I spoke to
Orton while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the
Methamphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura. He also
described where she lived. The description fit Laura Dable's trailer on
Park Street. This information seemed consistent with the information I
was receiving from Officers Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner. At that time I
decided to write a Search Warrant for Dable1s trailer in Randolph.
Because of the lateness of the hour (around 6:00 p.m.), I asked Justice
Court Judge Ross McKinnon to look over the warrant. I felt there was a
good chance that Dable would contact some of the people she had been
dealing with and they would remove the evidence from the trailer if we
didn't find it first. Judge McKinnon looked over and signed the
warrant.
After the warrant was signed, Officer Mark Lee and I searched the
trailer. We recovered 19 items. The list is as follows:
1. A baggie with a razer blade and residue from under the living room
coffee table.
2. A white plastic tube with residue from under the living room coffee
table.
3. Some green organic material (suspected Marijuana) from the glass top
of the living room coffee table.
4. Another whiteDigitized
plastic
tube
with
residue
It was found on the
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben inside.
Clark Law School, BYU.
top of the living room coffee
table.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX I
FINDINGS AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

VS.

Case No. 00110027 FS
Judge Judkins

LAURA DABLE
Defendant,

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on 25 June, 2001 at the hour of 10:00
A.M. and the Court having been fully briefed on the claims of the parties and having attended to
argument of counsel having found the pertinent and relevant facts of the case as follows:

FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr.
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine, which provided the basis
for the Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a description of her
residence was provided.
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2. On June 6, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from
the Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriff's Office. Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph,
Utah watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer
Clark allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he
felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey
stated in a June 14, 2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening", referring to
June 6, 2000.l
3. On June 7, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone callfromOfficer Clark
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to
Officer Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that she
had bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to
Wyoming where she was arrested.
4. Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavits copy of which
is on file with the Court. Officer Stacey, without assistance from the Rich County Attorney
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached
hereto as Exhibit B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to "look over",at around 6:00 p.m. on June 7,
2000.

All of the above data came from the notes of Officer Stacey, provided to Defendant by the Rich County Attorney's
office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant.
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5. Judge MdKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled
substances, packaging material, or any type of paraphernalia used with illegal controlled
substances. The search was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000
was at 20:59 hours.
The Court now concludes as a matter of law that:
6. The Statement and information in the Affidavit attributed to Law Enforcement Officers
even if said officer or officers were not known to the Affiant need no other verification or other
indicia of reliability and may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant
was a Peace Officer.
7. The information provided in the Affidavit, without any weight given to it except as
provided by the Wyoming officers was sufficient, to justify issuance of a Search Warrant given
the supporting circumstances of this case.
8. The fact that Defendant was not mirandized prior to her purported statement to
Wyoming Peace Officers does not require that the Magistrate refuse to consider said statements
as providing part of the basis for issuance of a warrant or that the Court give less weight to said
unmirandized statement.
9. Since the information provided in the Affidavit exclusive of that attributed to Threll
Orton is sufficient to justify the issuance of a Search Warrant; the omission of certain facts
surrounding his statement is not material to the evaluation of the Affidavit.
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10. Since the search commenced during daylight hours, the unsupported direction that
the Search Warrant could be executed day or night is harmless error.
11. The fact that the Search Warrant was a form in blank and was incompletely filled
out is harmless error.
12. The fact that the Affidavit contained unsupportable allegations, since those facts need
not necessarily be found in order to support issuance of the Search Warrant, that inaccuracy
does not bear on the adequacy of the Affidavit.
Based on the foregoingfindings,the Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized pursuant to the
Search Warrant issued in this case is denied.
Dated this

day of

2001

District Judge
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June 2000
Logan, Utah
Sunday

Tuesday I WednesdayJ Thursday

J Monday

hT

Saturday

Friday

r

r

Twi: 5:21am
Sun Rise:
5:55am
Sun Set: 8:54pm
[Twi: 9:28pm

Twi: 5:21am
Sun Rise:
5:54am
Sun Set: 8:55pm
[Twi: 9:29pm

Twi: 5:20am
Sun Rise: 5:54am
Sun Set: 8:56pm
Twi: 9:29pm

r

r

r

r

r

r

10

Twi: 5:20am
Sun Rise:
5:53am
Sun Set 8:57pm
[Twi: 9:30pm

Twi: 5:19am
Sun Rise:
5:53am
1Sun Set: 8:57pm
Twi: 9:31pm

Twi: 5:19am
I Sun Rise:
5:53am
Sun Set: 8:58pm
Twi: 9:32pm

Twi: 5:19am
Sun Rise: 5:52am
Sun Set: 8:59pm
Twi: 9:32pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set 8:59pm
Twi: 9:33pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:00pm
Twi: 9:34pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise: 5:52am
Sun Set: 9:00pm
Twi: 9:34pm

111

12

13

14

15

16

17

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:01pm
|Twi: 9:35pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:01pm
Twi: 9:35pm

Twi: 5:17am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set 9:02pm
Twi: 9:36pm

Twi: 5:17am
Sun Rise: 5:52am
Sun Set: 9:02pm
Twi: 9:36pm

Twi: 5:17am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:03pm
Twi: 9:37pm

Twi: 5:17am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:03pm
Twi: 9:37pm

Twi: 5:17am
Sun Rise: 5:52am
Sun Set: 9:03pm
Twi: 9:38pm

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:04pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set: 9:04pm
Twi: 9:38pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set 9:04pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise: 5:52am
Sun Set 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:52am
Sun Set 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:18am
Sun Rise:
5:53am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:19am
Sun Rise: 5:53am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

26

27

28

29

30

Twi: 5:20am
Sun Rise:
5:54am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:20am
Sun Rise:
5:54am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:20am
Sun Rise: 5:54am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:21am
Sun Rise
5:55am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

Twi: 5:21am
Sun Rise:
5:55am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
Twi: 9:39pm

I Twi: 9:38pm

25
Twi: 5:19am
Sun Rise:
5:53am
Sun Set: 9:05pm
| Twi: 9:39pm

DST is in effectforthe entire month
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